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NOTES
Antitrust Law-The Vertical Price Squeeze as Predatory
Pricing Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act
Anticompetitive conduct is an essential element of the monopolization
offense under section 2 of the Sherman Act.' The monopolist's pricing
behavior may itself be sufficiently destructive of competition to constitute
violative conduct. 2 Price behavior has long been governed by vague stan-
dards under section 2,1 but more precise rules are being developed. 4 In
Greyhound Computer Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp. ,5
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overlooked the
possibility of applying these developing rules to the price behavior of a
vertically integrated 6 monopolist.7 The court instead applied general defini-
tions of monopolizing conduct and in effect held that evidence of the ill
effects suffered by competitors as a result of a monopolist's pricing policies
is sufficient to support a finding of monopolization.8 Although the court
did not discuss it as such, the price behavior involved in Greyhound
was a vertical prize squeeze.9 The case can, therefore, be used to illustrate
1. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). The other essential element of monopolization is monopoly
power in the relevant market. See generally P. AREEDA, ANTrrRusT ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS,
TExr, CASES 227-259 (2d ed. 1974).
15 U.S.C. § 2(1976) provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monop-
olize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States,. . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony ....
Private plaintiffs may recover treble damages for violations of the Sherman Act. Id. § 15
(1976).
2. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 1, 43, 72-74. (1911).
3. See International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 722 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976) (listing various standards that have been applied in
predatory pricing cases). See also Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
under Section 2 of the Slierman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697-98 (1975).
4. See text accompanying notes 50-66 infra.
5. 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 782 (1978).
6. Vertical integration exists when a firm operates at more than one level in the chain of
production or distribution. P. AREEDA, supra note 1, 500, at 498. See also F. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 69-71 (1970).
7. It is noteworthy that the Ninth Circuit, which failed to see the relevance of precise
predatory pricing rules in Greyhound, has elsewhere taken the lead in embracing these devel-
oping rules. See Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1074 (1977).
8. 559 F.2d at 499-501. The court thus appears to have erroneously applied the Sherman
Act to protect competitors rather than competition. See Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 795 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 234 (1977).
9. See text accompanying notes 67-76 infra.
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significant possibilities for applying precise predatory pricing rules ° to
price behavior within a vertically integrated structure. Greyhound also
illustrates the need for precise rules in such cases, for the Greyhound court,
in applying general standards of conduct, failed to address adequately the
important issues raised by the case.
Plaintiff in Greyhound, a computer leasing company, buys computers
and leases them to users, competing at the leasing level with other leasing
companies and with various manufacturers who lease and sell computers. " I
Because customers generally prefer to lease computers from the Internation-
al Business Machines Corporation (IBM), the leasing companies buy
primarily from IBM. 2 IBM, however, has traditionally preferred to lease its
own computers rather than sell them, in order to minimize competition from
IBM-manufactured computers owned by others. t3 Therefore, when the
10. Predatory pricing is forbidden under the monopolization and attempt provisions of
Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), under Clayton Act § 2 as amended by the Robin-
son-Patman Act, id. § 13 (1976), and under Robinson-Patman Act § 3, id. § 13a. The
issues are the same under all of these provisions. Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 798-99 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 234 (1977); International Air
Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714,720 n.10 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 943 (1976); Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 697 n.1, 726-28; Williamson, Predatory
Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284, 284 n. 1 (1977). To the extent that
Robinson-Patman doctrine has differed from the Sherman Act approach, it offers little help in
the formulation of desirable rules for predatory pricing. See generally Sherwood, Robinson-
Patman Act Primary Line Injury: Meanderings from Porto Rico to Utah-and Beyond, 16
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 304 (1969).
11. 559 F.2d at 492; see Pantages, An Introduction to Leasing, 14 DATAMATION, Aug.
1968, at 26. In order to compete with the manufacturer, a leasing company must generally
underprice the manufacturer's lease price, because the leasing company's price often does not
include support services such as maintenance and because some customers will prefer to deal
directly with the manufacturer if the prices are equal. Leasing companies are able to underprice
the manufacturer's prices because they lease the equipment for longer than its economic life
expectancy as reflected in the manufacturer's rental rates. Leasing companies thus bear the risk
of economic obsolescence, which is a function of the technological obsolescence and declining
prices that result from rapid innovation. Id. at 492 n.1; G. BROCK, THE U.S. COMPUTER
INDUSTRY: A STUDY OF MARKET POWER 177 (1975); W. SHARPE, THE ECONOMICS OF COMPUTERS
498 (1969); J. SOMA, THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY 60-61 (1976); Gardner, Leasing: A Phenomenon
that Drains the Balance Sheets of All But IBM, 21 DATAMATION, July 1975, at 78.
12. 559 F.2d at 503 n.35; G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 177; W. SHARPE, supra note 11, at
494.
13. IBM can face competition from IBM-made computers in the hands of the leasing
companies and in the sales market for used computers. This competition is potentially quite
significant because computers are virtually indestructible. 559 F.2d at 491. They are, however,
subject to obsolescence. IBM did not sell its equipment at all until it was required to do so under
the terms of a 1956 consent decree, United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., 1956
Trade Cas. 68,245, at 71,123 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). In order to ensure the effectiveness of this
requirement the consent decree contained a provision requiring sale terms to be "commercially
reasonable" in relation to lease terms. Id. In addition to preventing competition from IBM-
made computers, IBM's leasing-only policy hindered competing manufacturers' efforts to copy
IBM equipment and to design compatible equipment, efforts that are generally approved under
a competitive policy. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 325, 350
(D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
In competing with leasing companies that deal in IBM computers, IBM can use two
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leasing companies began to grow in importance in the mid-1960's, 14 IBM
became concerned about the resulting increase in sales and the proportionate
decrease in its own leases. 5 The actions taken by IBM in response to the
growth of the leasing companies formed the basis of the Greyhound com-
plaint.
From the late 1960's to 1971, when IBM introduced its fourth genera-
tion of computers, 16 IBM substantially increased the ratio of its purchase
price to its lease price. 17 This ratio, called the multiplier,18 determines the
margin within which the leasing companies must operate because they must
pay the IBM purchase price and must compete with the IBM lease price. 19
Before the multiplier was increased, leasing companies had to lease a
computer for approximately forty-two months to recover the purchase price;
methods that depend on its status as manufacturer (as distinguished from lessor). First, IBM
can price its computers so as to make unattractive the purchase of IBM computers for leasing
purposes. This is the allegation of the Greyhound case. It is arguable that such a policy would
violate the 1956 consent decree's requirement that sale terms be commercially reasonable in
relation to lease terms. The consent decree did not specify a sale/lease price ratio, however, and
the burden of proving unreasonableness would probably be a heavy one for a leasing company.
This is especially true since the decree was framed with user-purchasers in mind, not leasing
companies; independent leasing companies did not exist in 1956. See G. BROCK, supra note 11,
at 177; W. SHARPE, supra note 11, at 494. The second IBM method of competing with the
leasing companies is to introduce innovations that make the leasing companies' stock of
computers less attractive to customers, thus devaluing that stock. These innovations, however,
also devalue IBM's stock of leasing computers. See note 16 infra. See generally Note, Innova-
tion Competition: Beyond Telex v. IBM, 28 STAN. L. Rev. 285 (1976).
14. G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 177; W. SHARPE, supra note 11, at 494.
15. 559 F.2d at 498. See also G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 178; W. SHARPE, supra note 11,
at 495.
According to the court of appeals, IBM preferred leasing because leasing revenues were
more constant than sales revenues, which were usually bunched in the first years after the
introduction of a new product. In addition, leasing generated particularly attractive profits after
the equipment was fully depreciated and facilitated the introduction of innovations, because the
lessee was not inhibited by a large investment in either the new or the old machines. This last
point is qualified by the fact that IBM is inhibited by a large investment in the old machines. For
other motivations, see note 13 supra. It should also be noted that IBM's profit rate on leases
was about 50% higher than that on sales. J. SOMA, supra note 11, at 61.
16. There have been four generations of IBM computers since the inception of the
industry in the early 1950's; the industry generally has followed a similar pattern. The first
generation was based on vacuum tubes, the second on transistors and the third on the integrated
circuit. The fourth generation, represented by the IBM System 370, is less clearly distinguished
from its predecessor than were previous generations and is sometimes considered part of the
third generation; it is based on a further development of the integrated circuit. See J. SOMA,
supra note 11, at 9-32. See also G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 11-21. This characteristic of the
fourth generation suggests that as the industry reaches maturity, innovation may lose some of
its generational nature and take on a steadier, more incremental character. See J. SOMA, supra
at 24, 136-37. Steadier innovation might not so severely devalue existing computers, especially
in view of the fact that upgrading present systems will be easier as a result of the incremental
character of innovation. See G. BROCK, supra at 17.
17. IBM contended that this increase did not in fact occur; the court of appeals found that
it did. 559 F.2d at 500-01 & 501 n.30.
18. Id. at 500.
19. See text accompanying notes 69-76 infra for a discussion of the vertical price squeeze.
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after the multiplier was increased, they had to lease a computer for forty-
eight months to recover the purchase price.2" The increase in the multiplier
thus made it more difficult for the leasing companies to recover their costs
on a new computer, and to this extent made the purchase of new computers
unattractive to the leasing companies. 2 Greyhound claimed that the result
was a restriction of competition in the leasing market in violation of section
2.22
IBM also increased the price at which it sold used computers. This was
accomplished in 1963 and 1964 by substantially curtailing the technological
discount that IBM had offered previously on the purchase price of used
computers. 23 This discount is a reflection of the rapidity with which com-
puters become obsolescent in the face of frequent innovation. 24 It had
previously amounted to ten percent of the original purchase price per year,
with seventy-five percent being the maximum possible reduction over time.
In 1964, however, IBM set the discount at twelve percent for the first year,
and eliminated the discount for succeeding years; this change applied to the
third generation of IBM computers, which was introduced in that year.25
Greyhound presented evidence that this change ended the previously quite
profitable practice of buying equipment late in a product cycle at a low price
that could be quickly recovered. Instead, purchases were inhibited late in a
product cycle because the leasing companies did not wish to pay relatively
high prices for older equipment that might soon be devalued by the introduc-
tion of a new generation of computers; the leasing companies' inventory
growth was therefore curtailed. Greyhound contended that the result was an
unlawful restriction of competition in the leasing market. 26
The trial court granted IBM a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's
case.27 The court of appeals reversed, holding that Greyhound had estab-
lished a prima facie case of monopolization. 28 The court concluded that
20. 559 F.2d at 500-01.
21. Id. Greyhound claimed that as a result, its access to IBM computers had been virtually
eliminated. Id. See also G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 178.
22. 559 F.2d at 500-01.
23. Id. at 499-500. IBM sold used computers to both leasing and sales dealers and sold
new computers to its lessees on purchase options. It did not, however, sell used computers
generally, preferring to retire them in favor of newer models. W. SHARPE, supra note 11, at 500-
01.
24. See note 16 supra.
25. 559 F.2d at 499-500. IBM had already reduced the discount in 1963, but not as
drastically as with the 1964 change. Id.
26. Id.
27. 1972 Trade Cas. 74,205 (D. Ariz. 1972). The district judge found that Greyhound had
not established that IBM had monopoly power in a relevant market and, apparently, alternative-
ly found that IBM's conduct did not meet the monopolization requirement. Id.
28. 559 F.2d at 503. The court also held that Greyhound had established a prima facie case
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there was sufficient evidence that a jury could reasonably conclude that IBM
had monopoly power29 in the relevant market-computer leasing.30 It then
found the evidence sufficient to support a finding that the increase in the
multiplier had "severely restricted" leasing company access to new IBM
computers 31 and that the change in the technological discount had largely
eliminated the leasing companies' purchases of older equipment.32 On the
basis of these findings, the court held that a jury could find the IBM pricing
policies were "unnecessarily exclusionary" and were thus an unlawful
means of maintaining the IBM monopoly in the leasing market. 33
Greyhound relied on the contention that IBM's pricing policies had
hindered Greyhound's purchase of IBM computers; this contention was
based upon the assumption that IBM had monopoly power in the sales
market. 34 IBM contended in the court of appeals that Greyhound should
therefore be required to prove the existence of this power, but the court held
such proof to be unnecessary. 35 Although it acknowledged that Greyhound
could have proceeded on the theory that IBM had used monopoly power in
the sales market to gain an advantage in the leasing market, 36 the court held
that Greyhound was also entitled to recover upon showing that "IBM
employed exclusionary tactics to maintain an existing monopoly in the lease
market. " 37 Because of the exclusionary effects in the leasing market caused
by the IBM pricing policies, the court held that Greyhound had presented a
prima facie case of monopolization. 38
The modem view of monopolization stems from Judge Learned
Hand's opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa).39
Prior to Alcoa, abusive or coercive behavior was an essential element of
of attempt to monopolize. Id. at 505. This aspect of Greyhound is an illustration of the Ninth
Circuit's unique attempt doctrine. See Blecher & Stegnian, Hanson v. Shell Oil Co.: A Straw in
the Wind?, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 269, 275-77, 275 nn.55 & 57 (1977); Cooper, Attempts and
Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72
MICH. L. REV. 373, 419-21 (1974).
29. 559 F.2d at 494-95. The court found this to be a close question, but "[c]onsidering the
weighty presumption in favor of a jury determination" concluded that leasing was a relevant
market. Id.
30. Id. at 496-97.
31. Id. at 501.
32. Id. at 499.
33. Id. at 502-03.
34. IBM allegedly raised its sales price relative to its lease price. To accomplish this, it
must have had the power to raise its sales price. See text accompanying notes 81-87 infra.
35. 559 F.2d at 503.
36. Id. (citing Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973); United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948)).
37. Id. (citing United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954)).
38. Id.
39. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). This case is commonly referred to simply as Alcoa.
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monopolization! 0 In Alcoa, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit4' decreased plaintiffs' burden of proof by holding that a
finding of monopolization could be based upon conduct that excluded
competition from the market42 and was not economically "inevitable" to a
well-run business. 43 This general formulation is the basis for more recent
definitions of monopolizing conduct, 44 including several formulated by the
Supreme Court.45
These general definitions have sometimes been applied without great
difficulty. 46 Often, however, problems can arise in distinguishing unneces-
sarily exclusionary conduct from economically inevitable conduct. 47 Such
problems are particularly severe when the conduct under attack is simply the
monopolist's pricing behavior, as is the case in Greyhound. The monopolist
is confronted with a continuous range of possible prices ;48 most of these
prices are exclusionary to some degree, 49 and all of them can be said to be
nonessential. Thus the general formulae of Alcoa and its successors offer
the monopolist little guidance in choosing from the range of possible prices
and offer the courts little guidance in judging the monopolist's choice.
A recognition of this difficulty has led to debate concerning the proper
predatory pricing standards. Professors Areeda and Turner have recently
40. See P. AREEDA, supra note 1, 11210(a). See also United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
41. The court was sitting as a surrogate for the Supreme Court under Act of June 9, 1944,
ch. 239, 58 Stat. 272 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1970)), when the Supreme Court could
not muster its statutory quorum for the case. 148 F.2d at 421.
42. 148 F.2d at 129-30.
43. Id. at 431. It is possible to view Judge Hand's opinion as holding that when monopoly
is proved, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that its conduct cannot be condemned
because it is merely the exercise of skill, foresight and industry. See United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954). This view of monopolization has not, however, prevailed. See United States v. Grinnell
Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 n.7 (1966).
44. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344-45 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (relying on Alcoa, holding that unnecessarily
exclusionary conduct would constitute monopolization); Cooper, supra note 28, at 390 & n.51.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (monopolizing
conduct is "the willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident"). This was the definition used by the Greyhound court. 559 F.2d at 492, 498. See also
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811-15 (1946).
46. Where the challenged conduct is a discrete action with consequences that can be
analytically isolated and evaluated, the general definition works well enough. The leasing-only
policy of United Shoe Machinery Corporation is an example. United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 325,350 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
47. See Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82
HARV. L. REv. 1207, 1219 (1969).
48. Price behavior is thus sharply distinguished from the discrete actions discussed at note
46 supra.
49. Any price below the monopolist's short-run profit maximization price will exclude the
firms that would enter if those high profits were in fact being made.
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offered a set of rules more clearly delineating the predatory pricing offense
by defining it in terms of objective and quantifiable criteria.5" Areeda and
Turner suggest that a monopolist's pricing practices should not be held to be
predatory without proof that its price was below its marginal cost 51 or, as a
more easily ascertainable surrogate, average variable cost.52 Limit pricing,
in which the monopolist maintains a price lower than its short-run profit
maximizing price in order to discourage new entry but does not price below
average variable cost, 53 would be allowed on the ground that such behavior
is a legitimate competitive strategy that excludes only less efficient rivals
from the market. 54 Furthermore, Areeda and Turner would allow temporary
reductions to average variable cost (reductions that may significantly deter
competition)55 on the same grounds.56
Reaction to this proposal has been varied. The courts have increas-
ingly cited the Areeda-Turner position,57 and they appear to welcome the
50. Areeda & Turner, supra note 3.
51. Id. at 709-16. Marginal cost is the incremental cost of producing an additional incre-
ment of output. Id. at 700.
52. Id. at 716-18. Variable costs are those that vary with output; they include costs for,
among other things, supplies and labor; variable costs are distinguished from fixed costs, which
do not in the short run vary with output. Id. at 700. If marginal cost is below average total cost,
pricing at marginal cost indefinitely is impossible, because the cost of overhead, including the
cost of capital, is not recovered. Therefore, a monopolist's marginal cost pricing policy may
drive an equally efficient competitor out of the market if that competitor has less "staying
power" (that is, access to capital) than the monopolist. Id. at 710. Areeda and Turner admit that
this possibility is troublesome but for several reasons see "no satisfactory method of eliminat-
ing this risk." Id. at 711. The equally efficient competitor bears losses at marginal cost pricing
only to the extent that the monopolist does. Furthermore, if any price floor above marginal cost
is imposed, less efficient firms will also be allowed to survive. In addition, the administrative
problems in determining and applying an appropriate price floor above marginal cost would be
insurmountable. Id.
Professor Williamson believes that average total cost is the appropriate price floor. Wil-
liamson, supra note 10, at 321-23. The courts, however, have increasingly followed the Turner
and Areeda position, see cases cited note 57 infra, so the following discussion will use marginal
(or average variable) cost pricing rules.
53. See generally F. SCHERER, supra note 6, at 219-34.
54. Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 705-06. The potential competition from possible
new entrants is valued precisely because it restrains the monopolist from reaping all possible
profits. See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 173-74 (1964). There-
fore, the monopolist should not be condemned for reacting to this competitive influence. Note,
Telex v. IBM: Monopoly Pricing Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 84 YALE L.J. 558, 562-63,
568-69, 576-83 (1975). Furthermore, actual competition from equally efficient firms remains
possible. See note 52 supra.
55. Temporary reductions can deter competition by teaching competitors, actual or poten-
tial, the lesson that future competition may be vigorously met by the monopolist. See Areeda &
Turner, supra note 3, at 706; Note, supra note 54, at 564-65. See also Williamson, supra note
10, at 290-93.
56. Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 706-12.
57. Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 797 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 234 (1977); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d
630, 638 n.34 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976); International Air Indus., Inc. v.
1978]
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increased certainty offered by purely cost-based rules.58 This judicial ac-
ceptance, however, has not been unreserved. Some courts may be willing to
hold that a monopolist's pricing behavior is predatory even if its prices
remain above average variable cost, if those prices are low enough to hurt
competition and the other prerequisites for predation exist in the market. 59
This approach to predatory pricing has been echoed by commentators who
argue that the relationship between the monopolist's costs and its prices is
but one factor among several to be considered in predatory pricing cases. 60
Thus it is argued that some temporary or selective price cuts are predatory,
even if the resulting prices are above average variable cost, if they signifi-
cantly deter competition. 61
The arguments against purely cost-based predatory pricing rules do not
fully answer the concerns of the Areeda-Turner position. 62 If the effect of
the monopolist's prices on its competitors rather than the relation of those
prices to its own costs is seen as the crucial factor in the existence of
predation, then the monopolist may be forced to overprice its product in
order to protect less efficient competitors. 63 If the short-run costs of the
monopolist are rejected as a guide to decision in favor of a more comprehen-
sive consideration of the long-range economic effects of the monopolist's
pricing policies, 64 then the courts are given the task of supervising prices on
American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 723-25 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976);
Weber v. Wynne, 431 F. Supp. 1048, 1059 (D.N.J. 1977).
58. See International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714,722-23 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
59. See, e.g., id. at 724. The court did, however, express some doubt as to the validity of
this approach, and in general praised the Areeda-Turner view highly. For an approach more
antithetical to the Areeda-Turner view, see, e.g., Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs.
Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 299 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd and remanded, 510 F.2d 894, 926-28 (10th
Cir. 1975).
60. Blecher & Stegman, supra note 28; Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act:
A Comment, 89 HARv. L. REv. 869 (1976) (reply to Areeda & Turner). See also Cooper, supra
note 28, 435-40; Note, supra note 54.
61. Note, supra note 54, at 569-70, 579. See also Williamson, supra note 10, at 292-93,
334.
62. An exception is Professor Williamson's approach. Like Areeda and Turner, William-
son rejects a wide ranging consideration of the economic environment of price behavior.
Williamson, supra note 10, at 288 n. 16. He argues, however, that the monopolist's troublesome
response to new entry is best dealt with by rules governing expansions of output rather than by
rules governing price-cutting. He proposes a rule under which a monopolist would be prohibited
from expanding its output in the short run after significant new entry. This grace period,
Williamson contends, would give the entrant a fair start toward reaching economies of scale.
After this period expires, cost-based predatory pricing rules would again be relevant. Id. at 331-
37. Although it is a significant contribution to the predatory pricing debate, this approach is not
helpful in Greyhound because Greyhound was an established company, having entered the
industry in 1962. 559 F.2d at 500 n.27.
63. Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 705-06; see also F. SCHERER, supra note 6, at 216-
19; Note, supra note 54, at 576-79.
64. See Scherer, supra note 60, at 890 (rejecting short-run costs as crucial factor).
[Vol. 56
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the basis of "intrinsically speculative and indeterminate" 65 considerations,
rather than on the basis of clear, bright-line rules. As a result, every price
change by a monopolist may become the occasion for a massive antitrust
suit. Ultimately, the courts may be catapulted into the task of ongoing price
supervision.66
Predatory pricing analysis examines conduct in its horizontal context;
that is, predatory prices are prohibited because of their effect on competition
within a single market. If, however, a monopolist operates on successive
market levels, as IBM does,67 then its behavior must be examined for
vertical implications as well. The question of what behavior, including price
behavior, within a vertically integrated structure is prohibited has been
another problem area in the law of monopolization. 68 If precise predatory
65. Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARV. L. REV. 891, 897
(1976). But see Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 HARV. L. REV. 901,902-03
(1976) (Areeda-Turner concern hinges on fear of excessive private treble damage actions and is
misplaced in context of government antitrust enforcement).
66. Although this problem is particularly acute in the context of private antitrust actions, it
is certainly arguable that the adversary model is an inappropriate vehicle for choosing welfare-
maximizing prices regardless of the identity of the plaintiff. See Williamson, supra note 10, at
288 n. 16 (long-run welfare maximizing approach advocated by Scherer evidently contemplates
supplanting antitrust enforcement with a price commission); cf. Areeda & Turner, supra note
65, at 896-97 (no "suitable, administrable rules" could be formulated to incorporate long-run
welfare maximizing factors identified by Scherer).
67. One level is the manufacturing and sales market; another level is the leasing market for
computers obtained from the sales division.
68. See Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Econom-
ic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Bork, Vertical Integration
and the Sherman Act]. Bork concludes that the antitrust laws should be entirely indifferent to
vertical considerations. Id. at 200-01. Bork continues to adhere to this view. See Bork, Vertical
Integration and Competitive Processes, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD MERGERS 139, 149 (J.
Weston & S. Peltzman eds. 1969). Contra, P. AREEDA, supra note I, 609(a), at 675 ("neither
the monopolist nor the law should be indifferent" to the extension of market power through
vertical integration).
Vertical integration may exist to achieve increased efficiencies, see F. SCHERER, supra
note 6, at 70, 86-87, or it may exist as a tool for the extension or protection of market power, see
P. AREEDA, supra 609. A monopolist that is vertically integrated can always gain a monopoly
at the second level if it wishes; for example, assuming no legal constraints, it may simply refuse
to deal with anyone on the second level except its own second level division. See Note,
Refusals to Deal by Vertically Integrated Monopolists, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1720 (1974) (discus-
sing Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973)). It is often stated that this
extension of market power is not socially detrimental because even a firm that has a monopoly
at both levels can make only one monopoly profit. This is so because the monopolist has a
single short-run profit maximization price for the product as it emerges from the second level
and the monopolist can make the entire monopoly profit at either level or can split it up however
the monopolist wishes. If the monopolist charges more than this price, output will drop, as will
the total profits for both levels. See P. AREEDA, supra 609(a), at 675; Bork, Vertical
Integration and the Sherman Act, supra at 172 n.65, 196. This analysis assumes that the product
of the first level exists in a fixed proportion in the product of the second level. See id. at 172
n.65. It has been argued that if the product of the first level is used in variable proportions at the
second level, vertical integration may increase monopoly profits. See McGee & Bassett,
Vertical Integration Revisited, 19 J.L. ECON. 17, 22, 25-28 (1976) (discussing and refuting this
contention, concluding that the increased monopoly profits result from the horizontal market
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pricing rules can be applied to conduct at a single level of a vertically
integrated firm, then some of the problems may be eliminated.
The pricing behavior at issue in Greyhound was a vertical price
squeeze, although the court did not discuss it as such. 69 The squeeze is a
means by which a vertically integrated monopolist can control the profit
margin of its unintegrated second level competitors who must buy its first
level product. The monopolist's second level price puts a ceiling on the
prices of its second level competitors, because they must compete with that
price; its first level price puts a floor under the competitors' costs, because
they presumably must purchase the first level product from the monopol-
ist. 70 Thus, by manipulating its prices at the first and second levels, the
power at the second level, not vertical integration). IBM's mainframe computers are a relatively
fixed proportional input into the leasing level; for every computer that the leasing companies
lease, they generally had to buy one IBM computer. See text accompanying note 12 supra. The
proportion of IBM peripheral devices and support services (other than maintenance, which is
usually obtained from IBM) purchased by the leasing companies is quite variable, however. See
G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 177-78; W. SHARPE, supra note 11, at 494-95. Thus, if variable
proportions allow an increase in profits through vertical integration, then the greater the extent
of IBM's integration (i.e., the greater the extent of its leasing monopoly), the more monopoly
profits IBM can make. This possibility should be seriously considered, for IBM's profit rate on
peripheral devices and support services is about 50% higher than the rate on mainframe units.
Thus, if through vertical integration IBM were able to increase the proportions of these services
used by lessees, its profits might rise significantly. Even if IBM took over the leasing level
completely, however, it could not legally tie these services or products to the leasing of
mainframe computers, see, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
(1953); therefore, this motive for extending its market power may be insubstantial.
Vertical integration may allow an increase in monopoly profits if it is necessary to a scheme
of systematic price discrimination. Such discrimination may be socially beneficial if it increases
output by lowering price to some consumers who would otherwise be unable to obtain the
product. See P. AREEDA, supra 609, at 675 & n.36; W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST
LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 100-16 (1973); Note, supra at 1729. Even if monopoly
profits cannot be increased by vertical integration, other reasons may exist for the extension of
market power by this means. If a monopolist is vertically integrated, its smaller first level
competitors may be forced to be vertically integrated also, in order to assure themselves of a
market for their product. This requirement may hinder the operation of those competitors by
increasing their capital requirements. Furthermore, if new entrants into the first level have to
enter at both levels, the additional capital required may raise significant entry barriers. P.
AREEDA, supra 609(a), at 675; J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 145-47 (1956). This
capital entry barrier argument is vigorously contested by vertical integration apologists on the
ground that the capital market will finance new entry into any market where excess profits are
being made. See, e.g., Bork, Vertical Integration and the Shennan Act, supra at 195. This
response does not completely rebut the entry barrier argument, however, because imperfec-
tions in the capital market may prevent the ready financing of new entrants. See, e.g., J. BAIN,
supra at 146; Note, supra at 1729.
69. The absence of such a discussion seems strange, because the Greyhound allegation
concerning the increase in the multiplier is explicitly an allegation of a squeeze; the Greyhound
argument concerning the change in the technological discount is also a squeeze allegation,
though less explicitly so.
70. They must purchase the first level product of the monopolist to the extent that that
product is a fixed-proportional requirement for second level production and to the extent that
the monopolist lacks competition that could supply second level needs. In other words, the
monopolist's ability to put a floor under second level costs is limited by the elasticity of the
demand curve facing the monopolist. See McGee & Bassett, supra note 68, at 25, 32 & n.37.
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monopolist can squeeze the profit margin of its second level competitors to
whatever level it wishes.71 Squeezing those profits merely to competitive
levels is socially beneficial, 72 and should therefore be lawful; 73 however, by
squeezing the profits to unremunerative levels, the monopolist can drive
competitors out of the market and gain a monopoly at the second level. It
seems clear that such a use of the squeeze to gain a second level monopoly
would constitute a section 2 violation 74 unless the squeeze were the result of
efficiencies possessed by the monopolist at the second level75 or efficiencies
resulting from vertical integration.76 Given that a squeeze to competitive
71. P. AREEDA, supra note 1, 1 609(c).
It has been argued that the vertical price squeeze is simply the use of a "deep pocket" from
one market to subsidize predatory pricing in another market, and is thus possible only if the
integrated firm is willing to forego a return on the capital that it has invested in the market in
which it is underpricing. Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act, supra note 68, at 198-
99; cf. Peltzman, Issues in Vertical Integration Policy, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD MERGERS,
supra note 68, at 167, 172 ("price squeeze is simply another name for predatory price cutting").
This is incorrect, for the vertically integrated monopolist can set its second level price at the
profit maximization level and can set its first level price to its competitors at a point at which
they cannot meet its second level price. If the monopolist has sufficient capacity at the second
level to meet the entire demand at the profit maximization price, then it can squeeze the
unintegrated second level competitors while profit maximizing, thus making the maximum
possible return on investment.
72. Profits at the second level may be above competitive levels if the second level
competitors exercise market power, either singly or in collusion. The existence of this "remax-
imization" is not inconsistent with the fact that there is only one monopoly profit to be gained
from integration across successive market levels, because there will be a smaller demand at this
remaximizing price, and total industry profits will fall as output is further restricted. A squeeze
to competitive profit margins at the second level prevents this result and is thus socially
beneficial. See, e.g., P. AREEDA, supra note 1, 609(c); Note, supra note 68, at 1731. But cf.
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (squeeze to competitive profit levels, effected by
maximum price provision in contract, per se unlawful under Sherman Act § 1 because of the
inherent dangers in all price fixing). A squeeze to competitive profit levels can be viewed as
simply a squeeze imposed by competition. An unintegrated second level firm could force
second level profits down to competitive levels through vigorous price competition. Thus, if the
monopolist forces second level prices only to competitive levels, its conduct may be viewed as
simply legitimate price competition at the second level.
73. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 437-38 (profit squeeze not
unlawful if unintegrated second level competition can make a "living profit" at prevailing
prices).
74. Id.; cf. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377-79 (1973) (refusal to
deal with second level competitors violates § 2); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo
Materials Corp., 273 U.S. 359, 375 (1927) (refusal to deal with second level competitors violates
§ 2). See also Note, supra note 68, at 1754-61 (refusal to deal can be effected through vertical
price squeeze).
75. Supplying a product at a lower price because of superior efficiencies would seem to be
a variety of "growth . . . as a consequence of a superior product [or) business acumen"
allowed by the Sherman Act. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
76. See id. But see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (marketing
efficiencies created by vertical merger would have deleterious effects on competitors; merger
disallowed, in part for this reason). Conceding that such efficiencies are desirable, difficult
questions remain concerning the burden of proof as to those efficiencies. See Areeda, Struc-
ture-Performance Assumptions in Recent Merger Cases, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD MERGERS,
supra note 68, at 27, 36-39 (efficiency justification for merger under Clayton Act § 7).
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profit levels is permissible, however, the formulation of standards to deter-
mine when the squeeze has become predatory is difficult.
Judge Hand examined this problem in the Alcoa case and held that a
prima facie case of a predatory squeeze had been established on the basis of
evidence that unintegrated second level firms could not make a "living
profit" by paying Alcoa's first level price and competing with its second
level price. 77 This holding would seem to permit a finding of predation on
the basis of the effect of a monopolist's prices on its competitors. The
holding, however, was premised explicitly on the assumption that Alcoa's
second level costs were equal to its competitors' costs. 78 Thus Alcoa may
alternatively be read as holding that the existence of predation, even in the
context of a vertical price squeeze, is in essence a function of the monopo-
list's prices and its costs. 79
This reading of Alcoa suggests that cost-based predatory pricing rules
may be applied to allegations of a vertical price squeeze. The monopolist's
second level prices can be examined to see if they would be predatory if the
monopolist's second level division were to purchase the first level product at
the same price that its competitors must pay. 80 Greyhound offered the Ninth
Furthermore, any desirable efficiencies must be balanced against possible anticompetitive
effects. See Note, supra note 68, at 1730-32.
77. 148 F.2d at 437-38.
78. Id. at 437.
79. The alternative reading of Alcoa is expressed in text following note 68 supra. This
reading seems inconsistent with the remainder of Alcoa. If the monopolist is able to underprice
its second level competitors and still recover its own second level costs, then the monopolist
would seem to be operating more efficiently than those competitors. This efficiency would
seem to be a variety of the "skill, foresight, and industry" that Hand viewed as acceptable
conduct. See 148 F.2d at 430. Moreover, in his discussion of the squeeze, Hand apparently
accepted the district court's position that a squeeze was impossible if Alcoa were not selling
"below the cost of [second level] production, measuring ingot price as part of the cost." Id. at
437.
80. A somewhat similar approach is advocated in Note, supra note 68, at 1760. The
analysis there advocated would also assume that the monopolist's second level division pur-
chases the first level product at the same price that the second level competitors must pay. It
would then compare the monopolist's "rate of profit from. . .sales of the final product," id.,
with the rate of profit gained from sales of the first level product to second level competitors;
the monopolist would be allowed to charge any prices that did not cause the first figure to fall
below the second.
This approach would not allow the monopolist to profit maximize at the first level while
competing at the second level. Antitrust policy, however, does not discourage such behavior.
See notes 72 & 73 and accompanying text supra. If "rate of profit from. . . sales of the final
product" refers to simply the second level rate of profit, then a monopolist that profit-
maximizes at the first level while competing at the second would almost always violate the rule,
because the competitive second level rate of profit would almost always be below the rate of
profit at the first level. If "rate of profit from. . . sales of the final product" means the rate of
profit for both levels combined, then the monopolist would still be forbidden to profit maximize
at the first level while competing at the second. The monopolist has some of its capital invested
in its competitive second level subsidiary, which receives a lower rate of return than its first
level monopoly. The total rate of profit will, therefore, be somewhat lower than the first level
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Circuit the opportunity to take such an approach. The Greyhound court,
however, did not recognize this possibility, perhaps because the court did
not recognize the case as an instance of a vertical price squeeze.
Greyhound contended that IBM had hindered Greyhound's purchase of
IBM computers by raising the purchase price relative to the IBM lease
price. 81 Thus Greyhound's case necessarily rested on the premise that IBM
had the power to control price in the manufacturing and sales market.8 2 The
court of appeals held, however, that Greyhound was not required to prove
the existence of that power.83 Greyhound was instead allowed to rely simply
on the theory, stemming from general definitions of monopolization, that
IBM had used exclusionary practices to maintain an existing monopoly in
the leasing market. 84 The IBM leasing monopoly, however, is dependent on
IBM dominance of the manufacturing and sales market, because the IBM
leasing division leases only IBM computers. Moreover, the conduct chal-
lenged by Greyhound-specifically, the adjustment of the multiplier and
technological discount-occurred at least partially in the sales market.8
Thus, IBM may be found to have monopolized the leasing market on the
basis of conduct that occurred outside the leasing market. This approach to
the analysis of a vertical squeeze is unusual, in that other cases have been
based on proof of monopoly power at the first level. 86 The Greyhound
approach, dispensing with formal proof of first level power, seems accept-
able so long as the factual existence of the squeeze is solidly proved.87
It is important to recognize, however, that a necessary implication of the
rate of profit. Thus, a monopolist's profit maximization at the first level and competition at the
second level would always violate the proposed rule.
The proposed rule goes astray in using rate of profit, rather than amount of monopoly
profit, as a basis for comparison. If the dollar amount of monopoly profit earned at both levels
from the monopolist's sale of the final product (a figure that excludes the competitive profit
made at the second level) were compared to the amount of monopoly profit made from first
level sales to second level competitors, a rule prohibiting the first figure from falling below the
second would be consistent with antitrust policy. Violation of the rule would indicate that the
monopolist was charging its competitors more than it charged its subsidiary. See text accom-
panying notes 93 & 94 infra.
81. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
82. A vertical price squeeze cannot occur in the absence of market power at the first level.
Without such power, a firm cannot raise its first level price without losing sales. Cf. Peltzman,
supra note 71, at 172 (price squeeze impossible without market power of the first level or
cheaper access to capital; the latter, however, is better analyzed as merely predatory pricing).
83. 559 F.2d at 503.
84. Id. (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); United States
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,343 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'dpercuriam, 347 U.S.
521 (1954)); see text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
85. The court's opinion does not make clear to what extent the sales price and the lease
price, respectively, were changed to accomplish the change in the multiplier. See 559 F.2d at
500-01.
86. E.g., Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 438.
87. "Greyhound was not required to prove the source of IBM's power to do what
Greyhound's evidence indicated IBM in fact did." 559 F.2d at 503.
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Greyhound ruling is that IBM had monopoly power in the sales market. The
existence of such power, though Greyhound was not required to prove it, is
a premise of further analysis of IBM's squeeze of the leasing companies.
Accepting that IBM was squeezing the leasing companies, the court
was further required to decide whether the squeeze was predatory. The court
held that Greyhound had established a prima facie case of predation on the
basis of evidence that Greyhound had sharply reduced its purchases of new
equipment when the multiplier was raised and largely ceased buying older
equipment when the technological discount was reduced.88 Thus, the court
relied entirely on evidence of the effect of IBM's pricing behavior on
competitors in holding that behavior predatory. 89
Greyhound might be seen as simply an application of the Alcoa
"living profit" principle. The Greyhound court's disregard of IBM's costs,
however, is a disturbing departure from the Alcoa approach. The Grey-
hound court did not assume, as Judge Hand did in Alcoa, that IBM's
second level costs were equal to those of its second level competitors. Nor
did the Greyhound court state that IBM could rebut the inference of
predation with evidence of its own costs. The failure of the court of appeals
to mention this possibility raises the question whether the court realized that
a determination of IBM's leasing division costs is central to the issue of
predation. 90 If the court did not recognize the existence of this crucial issue,
there is a danger that in the future the court may permit even weaker
evidence to constitute a prima facie case of monopolization. Thus, by
relying on general definitions of monopolization, 91 the court may overlook
crucial issues and allow unmeritorious cases to reach the jury. This is the
specter raised by Greyhound.
Despite the failure of the court to perceive it as such, Greyhound offers
an opportunity for a rigorous approach to the analysis of a vertical price
squeeze through the application of precise predatory pricing rules to a
vertically integrated structure. The question raised by applying cost-based
rules to the Greyhound vertical squeeze is whether the IBM lease price
88. See id. at 499-501.
89. In its holding on the technological discount, the court also relied to a degree on
evidence, in the form of internal IBM memoranda, that IBM had a subjective intent to
monopolize. Id. at 499. Intent has been a dead issue in the law of monopolization since Judge
Hand laid it to rest in Alcoa. 148 F.2d at 431-32. The Greyhound court's resurrection of it may
simply be a spillover from the court's discussion of the attempt claim, 559 F.2d at 504-05, since
specific intent is relevant in attempt cases. See generally sources cited at note 28 supra.
90. See text accompanying notes 50-56 supra.
91. The court relied generally on the Grinnell definition of monopolizing conduct, United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); see note 45 supra, finding that IBM's
actions represented the willful maintenance of monopoly power. 559 F.2d at 498. As already
noted, see text accompanying notes 47-49 supra, this definition is not useful as a guide to
judging price behavior.
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would be below the IBM leasing division's average variable cost if that
division's cost for an IBM computer were the same as that of the leasing
companies. 92 If the IBM leasing division "pays" the same price as the
leasing competitors and the IBM lease price is below the leasing division's
average variable cost, then Greyhound has established a clear case of
predation. If the leasing division remains profitable because it "pays" less
for computers than do the leasing companies, then IBM's adjustment of the
multiplier and technological discount emerges as an instance of systematic
price discrimination that offers no welfare gain to society93 unless the
discrimination reflects efficiencies of vertical integration. 94 In the absence
of such efficiencies, this discrimination should constitute a section 2 viola-
tion. 95
If the IBM sales division charges the same price to the IBM leasing
division and the leasing companies, and the IBM lease price is not less than
the leasing division's average variable cost, then several possibilities re-
main. IBM may be squeezing the leasing companies only to competitive
profit levels,96 or IBM may be more efficient at the leasing level than the
leasing companies and therefore able to underprice them. 97 In either event,
IBM should not be held to have monopolized the leasing market. 98 A
contrary conclusion would require IBM to adhere to an "umbrella price"
99
in order to give rivals a share of monopoly profits or to protect them from
their own inefficiency. IBM may also be able to underprice its second level
competitors because of efficiencies resulting from vertical integration. IBM
should probably be allowed to reap the benefit of these efficiencies, as a
primary goal of the antitrust laws is to promote the efficient allocation of
resources. 
100
92. This approach entails a difficult problem of attributing joint or common costs among
the divisions of the monopolist. See Note, supra note 68, at 1760 & n.220. Nevertheless,
despite its difficulties, this approach seems the most reliable way to analyze a vertical price
squeeze. Id.
93. For a discussion of price discrimination through vertical integration, see note 68
supra.
94. But see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 256 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd,
384 U.S. 563 (1966); Note, supra note 54, at 558 n.5. See also Note, supra note 68, at 1728 n.52.
96. Greyhound claimed damages based on a 30% profit margin. 559 F.2d at 507 & n.40
(derived).
97. There is no indication in the record to support this position.
98. See notes 75 & 76 and accompanying text supra.
99. An umbrella price is a price so high that it encourages entry even by less efficient
firms. See Note, supra note 54, at 561-62.
100. See notes 75 & 76 supra.
A final possibility is that if consumers prefer to lease directly from IBM, then IBM can
charge a premium price that allows it to compete with the leasing companies at a higher price
than they can charge. Therefore, IBM can cut its lease price to the leasing division's average
variable cost (a dollar figure that does not include the accumulated good will that gives IBM its
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If predatory pricing policy is not analyzed exclusively on the basis of
cost-based rules, other factors may be relied upon to support Greyhound's
prima facie case. 10 1 The Greyhound court failed to examine adequately the
market conditions that would make a predatory squeeze profitable for IBM,
when such an examination would have strengthened its holding.
The squeeze in Greyhound was directed at one of the submarkets of the
computer systems industry, 0 2 the leasing market. The pattern of competi-
tion in the industry has been for IBM to compete vigorously when it is
challenged in single submarkets while reaping greater profits in those
submarkets in which it faces little competition. 10 3 IBM has thereby gained a
reputation as "hyperaggressive,'1' 4 which may have discouraged invest-
ment in IBM's competitors I 5 and deterred competition in all of the indus-
try's submarkets.
Discouraging entry into single submarkets is important to IBM because
a major barrier to entry into the manufacture of mainframe computers is the
necessity of entering a number of other submarkets simultaneously in order
to market a computer system. 106 If strong, independent companies were to
develop in the various submarkets, entry into mainframe manufacturing
might well be easier. 07 The leasing market is particularly important in this
regard because in the absence of leasing companies to market the computers
of various manufacturers' 0 8 a new manufacturer must make a large capital
premium status), and the leasing companies would have to price below their average variable
cost to stay competitive, assuming equal costs at the leasing level, because they lack IBM's
premium value. This possibility presents a difficult problem for predatory pricing analysis. The
prices are not predatory under strict cost-based rules; yet if these prices are permitted, an
entrenched monopolist may obtain an almost impregnable position. See Sherwood, supra note
10, at 341 n. 194; Note, supra note 54, at 573 n.78, 574 n.84. One solution would be to deduct the
premium value, assuming that can be calculated, see id. at 573 n.78, from the monopolist's price
before applying the cost-based predatory pricing rules.
101. The market must be examined to determine the existence of the prerequisites of
predation, such as substantial entry barriers. See Scherer, supra note 60, at 890.
102. The industry is composed of a number of submarkets, including mainframe manufac-
ture, peripheral devices, maintenance, software, and distributional submarkets such as leasing.
See generally J. SOMA, supra note 11, at 129-45.
103. W. SHEPHERD, MARKET POWER AND ECONOMIC WELFARE 229 (1970). For example,
IBM engaged in a vigorous campaign against the newly developed manufacturers of peripheral
devices designed for IBM computers and at the same time raised its mainframe prices, See
generally G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 132-34, 173-77.
104. G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 63.
105. Id. at 62-63; see Gardner, supra note 11, at 82-86.
106. G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 62, 231; J. SOMA, supra note 11, at 41-43; cf. note 68
supra (entry barriers raised by dual entry requirement resulting from vertical integration).
107. See G. BROCK, supra note II, at 60-61, 231.
108. Even though the leasing companies do not now generally handle computers by other
makers, they might do so in the future, when both they and the other manufacturers are
stronger. Cf. J. SOMA, supra note 11, at 129-36 (structural atomization of industry submarkets
likely to continue).
[Vol. 56
PEN REGISTERS
investment in a stock of computers for leasing. 109 This requirement is in fact
the major capital entry barrier into the manufacturing market. 110 Thus, by
restricting the growth of strong leasing companies, IBM maintains signifi-
cant capital entry barriers in the manufacturing market.
These additional and more subjective factors support the conclusion
that IBM violated the antitrust laws by engaging in a socially undesirable
price squeeze. It should be remembered, however, that when predatory
pricing analysis is opened to considerations beyond the monopolist's costs
the advantages of the cost-based rules are diminished, and the analysis leans
toward the "intrinsically speculative and indeterminate" 111 approach such
rules are designed to avoid.
The problem of determining standards for a monopolist's price behav-
ior is compounded when that behavior occurs on successive market levels,
as in the Greyhound case. Clear and precise standards are needed to guide
the monopolist and the courts. Such standards are available in the form of
cost-based predatory pricing rules, which can be applied to the vertically
integrated monopolist. The court of appeals in Greyhound overlooked the
possibility of such an application, relying on general definitions of mono-
polization to find a prima facie case of monopolization. The court over-
looked or ignored the crucial issue of IBM's costs as a measure of the
propriety of its prices; IBM's potential defenses based on cost considera-
tions went unnoticed, leaving open the unhappy possibility that even weaker
cases will be approved in the future. The Greyhound court thus decided, for
badly flawed reasons, to enter the economic thicket of judicial supervision
of IBM's pricing policies.
MICHAEL L. BALL
Criminal Procedure-Pen Registers: Compelling
Third Party Assistance Under the All Writs Act
A pen register is a mechanical device that records the outgoing num-
bers dialed on a monitored telephone, but that does not overhear oral
communications or record whether a call is actually completed.1 Because
109. G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 57-60.
110. Id.;J. SOMA, supra note 11, at 41.
111. Areeda & Turner, supra note 65, at 897.
1. A pen register is attached to a telephone line usually at a central telephone office. In
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pen registers, unlike wiretapping and eavesdropping devices, 2 are not gov-
erned by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 (Title III),' the manner of their use has remained a matter within the
discretion of the federal courts. In United States v. New York Telephone
Co.4 the United States Supreme Court considered the question whether a
United States District Court may properly direct a telephone company to
provide federal law enforcement officials the facilities and technical assist-
ance necessary for the execution of its order authorizing the use of pen
registers. The Court held that the district court had power under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (rule 41)1 to authorize the use of pen
registers, and power under the All Writs Act6 to order the telephone
company to furnish assistance. Although the New York Telephone Co.
decision is consistent with recent courts of appeals rulings7 and with
congressional action concerning electronic surveillance under Title 1II, 8 it
the case of a rotary dial telephone, it records on a paper tape dashes equal in number to the
number dialed; for incoming calls, it records a dash for each ring of the telephone but does not
identify the number from which the incoming call originated. See United States v. Caplan, 255
F. Supp. 805, 807 (E.D. Mich. 1966). In the case of a touch tone telephone, the device (TR-12)
prints the digits dialed in Arabic numerals. See United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033,
1039-40 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd
mem., 473 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
2. "Wiretapping" is the interception of communication by means of a physical connec-
tion with a communications system at a point between the sender and the receiver; "eavesdrop-
ping" refers to the interception of communication by means of a mechanical or electronic
device that is not physically connected with the communications system. 74 AM. JUR. 2d
Telecommunications §§ 211, 216 (1974). See generally A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 73-78
(1967).
3. Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801-804, 82 Stat. 211 (1968). Section 802 of Title III amended
part I of title 18, United States Code, by adding a new chapter entitled "Chapter 119-Wire
Interception and Interception of Oral Communication" (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970)). Sec-
tion 803 of Title III amended § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat.
1064 (formerly codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964)), to conform with the new chapter, which was
intended to be a comprehensive electronic surveillance statute. Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 803, 82 Stat. 211 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1970)). See generally S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 89-109, reprinted in [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2177-97 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. See also text
accompanying notes 19-30 infra.
4. 98 S. Ct. 364 (1977).
5. Rule 41(b) authorizes federal magistrates and state judges to issue a warrant to search
for and seize any "(1) property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal
offense; or (2) contraband, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed; or (3)
property designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as the means of committing a
criminal offense." FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b). See also text accompanying notes 32-37 infra.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970); see text accompanying note 48 infra.
7. See Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 716
(1978); United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976). But see Application
of the United States for an Order Authorizing Use of a Pen Register Device, 407 F. Supp. 398
(W.D. Mo. 1976).
8. Congress amended Title III in 1970 by adding the following language to § 2518(4):
An order authorizing the interception of a wire or oral communication shall, upon
request of the applicant, direct that a communication common carrier . . . shall
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raises serious questions about the scope of authority conferred by rule 41
and the All Writs Act.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
issued an order authorizing agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) to install and use pen registers on two telephones upon finding that
there was probable cause to believe that the two telephones were being used
in connection with an illegal gambling operation. 9 The order also directed
the New York Telephone Company (the Company) to furnish the FBI" [a]ll
information, facilities, and technical assistance" necessary to employ the
pen registers unobtrusively, 10 and it directed the FBI to compensate the
Company at prevailing rates." The Company provided the FBI with the
information it needed to install the pen registers, but it refused to lease the
lines to the FBI that were required to install the pen registers in an incon-
spicuous location, away from the building containing the telephones. 12 The
district court denied the Company's motion to vacate that part of the order
directing it to provide assistance, and the Company appealed. 13
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that part of the
orddr authorizing the use of pen registers, concluding that pen registers are
not subject to the provisions of Title m and that district courts have power,
either inherently or as a "logical derivative" of rule 41, to order pen register
surveillance upon a showing of probable cause. 14 The Second Circuit,
furnish the applicant forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance
necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of inter-
ference with the services that such carrier . . . is according the person whose
communications are to be intercepted.
Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 21 l(b), 84 Stat. 654 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)
(1970)). The amendment provides further that such carrier be compensated at prevailing rates.
d. It was passed following the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Application of the United States for Relief, 427 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1970), which held
that, absent specific statutory authority, a district court was without power to compel a
telephone company to provide assistance in the interception of wire communications conducted
pursuant to Title III. Id. at 644. See also note 91 infra.
9. 98 S. Ct. at 367.
10. In re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 538 F.2d 956, 957 (2d Cir. 1976),
rev'd sub nom. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 98 S. Ct. 364 (1977). The language that the
district court used in its order tracked the language of the 1970 amendment to Title III.
Compare 538 F.2d at 957 with note 8 supra.
Ii. 98 S. Ct. at 367.
12. The Company advised the FBI to string its own wires from the "subject apartment" to
another location where the pen registers could be installed, but the FBI determined that this
could not be accomplished without alerting the suspects and jeopardizing the investigation. Id.
13. In re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 416 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y:), aff'd
in part and rev 'd in part, 538 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. United States v. New York
Tel. Co., 98 S. Ct. 364 (1977). The Second Circuit denied the Company's motion to stay the pen
register order pending appeal, and the Company then provided the leased lines. 98 S. Ct. at 368.
14. In re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 538 F.2d 956, 960 (2d Cir. 1976),
noted in 8 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 538 (1977). The court concluded that the power to order pen register
surveillance is the equivalent of the power to order a search pursuant to a search warrant, and is
19781
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however, reversed that part of the order directing the Company to provide
facilities and technical assistance. It assumed, arguendo, that a district court
has authority to compel assistance by the Company, but concluded that "in
the absence of specific and properly limited Congressional action, it was an
abuse of discretion for the District Court to order the Telephone Company to
furnish technical assistance." 15 The Supreme Court interpreted the Second
Circuit's holding "as generally barring district courts from ordering any
party to assist in the installation or operation of a pen register." 16 It agreed
"that the power of federal courts to impose duties upon third parties is not
without limits,' 1 7 but the Court concluded that the district court was
authorized by the All Writs Act to order the Company to provide technical
assistance to implement the pen register order.'18  ",
The decision of the Supreme Court in New York Telephone Co. can
best be understood in light of the statutory authority upon which it relies-
Title III, rule 41 and the All Writs Act. Title III was intended to be a
comprehensive electronic surveillance statute, 19 prohibiting all wiretapping
and other types of electronic surveillance 20 except by law enforcement
officials 2' investigating specified crimes22 and acting pursuant to rigid pro-
cedures 23 under judicial supervision. 24 Title III, however, authorizes only
those orders "authorizing or approving the interception of a wire or oral
communication. "25 "Intercept" is defined as "the aural acquisition of the
thus subject to the requirements of the fourth amendment. Because the district court issued the
order upon a showing of probable cause, the court held that it had been properly granted. Id.
15. Id. at 961. Judge Mansfield dissented on the grounds that the district court had power
under the All Writs Act to compel the Company to provide assistance and that it did not abuse
its discretion in exercising that power. He noted that the result of holding that the Company
cannot be directed to provide assistance in installing pen registers might result in more intrusive
electronic surveillance for the reason that the Company can be required to provide assistance in
installing a wiretap under Title III. Id. at 964 n.1 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
16. 98 S. Ct. at 372.
17. Id.
18. Id. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Stevens filed an opinion
dissenting in part in which Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall joined, and in which Justice
Stewart joined in part. Justice Stevens took the position that Congress has not given district
courts the power either to authorize the use of a pen register under rule 41 or to require private
parties to assist in carrying out such surveillance under the All Writs Act. He concluded that
because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and because those limits should be
adhered to strictly when a court purports to authorize and implement the invasion of an
individual's privacy, the Court's "rush to achieve a logical result" in this case must await
congressional action. Id. at 375-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
19. See generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 66-67, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 2153-54. See also Blakey & Hancock, A Proposed Electronic Surveil-
lance Control Act, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 657 (1968).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970).
21. Id. § 2516.
22. Id.
23. Id. § 2518.
24. Id. § 2519.
25. Id. § 2518(1) (emphasis added).
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contents of any wire or oral communication." 26 Because pen registers do
not "aurally" 27 acquire the "contents" 28 of any communication, they are
not covered by Title JlI;29 each court of appeals that has considered the
matter has so concluded. 3° The question presented, therefore, concerns the
source of the district courts' authority to issue pen register orders. The
courts of appeals have found a basis for that authority either in the "inherent
power" of a district court 31 or in rule 41.
Rule 41(b) authorizes a federal magistrate to issue a warrant to search
for and seize, among other things, "property that constitutes evidence of the
commission of a criminal offense.''32 The difficulty in using the rule to
authorize the issuance of a pen register order is that the evidence seized by
means of the pen register-numbers dialed on a telephone-does not fit the
definition of the term "property." Rule 41(h) defines property "to include
documents, books, papers and any other tangible objects." , 33 Thus, strictly
construed, rule 41 does not purport to authorize warrants to search for and
seize "nontangibles" such as evidence gained as a result of pen register
surveillance. 34 Of the four courts of appeals that have invoked rule 41 as
authority for the issuance of a pen register order, three have done so by
26. Id. § 2510(4) (emphasis added).
27. "Aural" is not defined in Title III. The OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY gives the
following definition: "1. Of or pertaining to the organ of hearing. 2. Received or perceived by
the ear."
28. "Contents" is defined as "includ[ing] any information concerning the identity of the
parties to such communication or the existence, substance, purport, or meaning of that
communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (1970).
29. The Senate report on Title III indicates that pen registers were intended to be excluded
from coverage: "The proposed legislation is not intended to prevent the tracing of phone calls.
The use of a 'pen register,' for example, would be permissible. . . . The proposed legislation is
intended to protect the privacy of the communication itself and not the means of communica-
tion." SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 90, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 2178 (citation omitted). Both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit cited this language in
support of their conclusion that pen registers are not covered by Title III. See 98 S. Ct. at 370;
In re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 538 F.2d 956, 958 (2d Cir. 1976).
30. See Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); cases cited note 7 supra. But cf. United States v.
Lanza, 341 F. Supp. 405 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (pen register used in conjunction with wiretap is
authorized by Title III wiretap order).
31. Both the Eighth and the Seventh Circuits have suggested that the inherent authority of
a district court to issue a pen register order has been "necessitated" by the special nature of
electronic communications. See United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243,245
& n.5 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 716 (1978); United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
531 F.2d 809, 811 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1976).
32. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b); see note 5 supra.
33. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(h) (emphasis added).
34. But cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16 (1967) (dicta that rule 41(d)
would not require prior notice of an otherwise constitutionally valid order authorizing electron-
ic surveillance); 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 661, at 21 (1969) (rule 41
should be read as applying to verbal statements).
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analogy. 35 Only the Sixth Circuit, in Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v.
United States,36 actually held that rule 41 gives district courts that power.
37
The question whether a district court is empowered to issue a valid
order does not arise in most cases of electronic surveillance, because Title
11 expressly authorizes the interception of wire and oral communications
subject to the procedures therein; 38 however, because pen registers are
outside the scope of Title I, the authority to issue an order for their use
must be found, if at all, in the pre-1968 power of a federal magistrate to
order electronic surveillance. 39 In Katz v. United States ,4 decided in 1967,
the United States Supreme Court indicated that a magistrate's power to order
electronic surveillance is equivalent to his power to issue a search warrant,41
and that such an order could properly issue if the manner of its issuance met
constitutional standards.42 Thus, unless Congress intended in 1968 to pro-
35. See United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243,245 n.5 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 716 (1978); In re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 538 F.2d
956, 959 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 98 S. Ct. 364
(1977); United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 811 n.2, 813 (7th Cir. 1976).
36. 565 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977). Michigan Bell Telephone Co. actually involved the use of
a "trapping" or "tracing" device, but the Sixth Circuit concluded that the rules applicable to
pen registers were controlling. Id. at 388. A trace determines the telephone numbers of calls
incoming to the monitored telephone. Id. at 388 n.5.
37. Id. at 389.
38. See text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
39. The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of electronic surveillance
in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). In Olmstead, the Court held that neither the
fourth nor the fifth amendment barred admission into evidence of information obtained by
tapping defendants' telephone lines. Id. at 462, 466. Congress then enacted the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, § 605 of which prohibited the interception without authorization and
divulgence or publication of any wire or radio communication. Ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970)). In Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937), enforced,
308 U.S. 338 (1939), the Court applied the exclusionary rule to evidence offered in a federal
prosecution that was obtained in violation of § 605. 302 U.S. at 382; 308 U.S. at 340. The Court
considered electronic eavesdropping for the first time in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129 (1942), and relied upon Olmstead in holding that there was no violation of the fourth
amendment because there was no physical trespass in connection with the eavesdropping. Id.
at 135. In Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), however, the Court held that
evidence obtained by means of a "spike mike"-a spike with a microphone attached inserted
into a party wall-was inadmissible because there was "actual intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area" in violation of the fourth amendment. Id. at 512. Finally, in Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), the Court held that "conversation" is protected by the fourth
amendment and that the use of electronic devices to capture it constitutes a "search." Id. at 51.
The Court then found that a New York statute authorizing electronic eavesdropping failed to
meet the requirements of the fourth amendment. Id. at 58-60; cf. Osborn v. United States, 385
U.S. 323, 329 (1966) (evidence obtained by means of recording device authorized subject to
"precise and discriminate" procedures admissible). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 34, §
665.
40. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
41. Id. at 354-56 & 355 n.16.
42. The Court indicated that electronic surveillance would be constitutionally permissible
under the following circumstances: law enforcement officials must obtain advance authoriza-
tion.by a neutral magistrate upon a showing of probable cause; they must observe the precise
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hibit all types of electronic surveillance except that expressly authorized
under Title rH,4 3 the permissibility of the use of pen registers arguably
depends solely on compliance with the requirements of the fourth amend-
ment. This was in fact the conclusion reached by four Supreme Court
Justices in United States v. Giordano44 upon finding that pen registers are
not subject to the provisions of Title 1n. 45 Relying upon the specific
language of Justice Powell in Giordano, each court of appeals that has
directly confronted the matter has decided that the power to order pen
register surveillance is either a power analogous to that in rule 41 or the
power lodged in rule 41 itself .46 The power to order pen register surveillance
is a nullity however, when, as in this case, the telephone company refuses to
provide facilities and technical assistance. 47 Consequently, the lower courts
have looked to the All Writs Act for the authority to compel assistance.
The All Writs Act provides: "The Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate
in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law." 48 Because district courts are "courts established by Act
of Congress," the statute applies to them.49 It is primarily invoked by the
Supreme Court50 and the courts of appeals, 51 however, in the exercise of
their appellate jurisdiction; the power to grant a writ is characterized as an
appellate power. 52 The writs more commonly issued under the Act are writs
of mandamus or prohibition, 53 although the Act itself authorizes "all writs"
limits established by a specific order; and they must notify the authorizing magistrate of all that
is seized. Id. at 356. Those requirements were not met in Katz. Id.
43. Congress intended to prohibit the interception and disclosure of all wire or oral
communication except as otherwise provided in Title III. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 90,
91, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2178, 2180. "Intercept" is a defined
term, however, and does not reach the use of pen registers. See note 29 supra.
44. 416 U.S. 505, 548 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45. Id. at 553-54 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court did not
reach the issue because it concluded that the evidence obtained by means of the pen register
was derived from an illegal wire interception. Pen register surveillance had been authorized by
extension orders following the initial illegal wiretap order. Id. at 533 n.19.
46. See cases cited in notes 35 & 36 supra.
47. The Second Circuit found that without the Company's technical assistance, the pen
register order would be "worthless." In re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 538
F.2d 956, 961 (2d Cir. 1976).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970).
49. 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.26, at 278 (2d ed. 1975).
50. Id. 110.27.
51. Id. 110.28.
52. 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3932, at 184 & n.3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
53. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 49, 110.26, at 278. For an excellent
summary of the All Writs Act and the power to issue a writ of mandamus, see Judge Friendly's
opinion in United States v. Weinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 709-13 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 917 (1972).
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and that language has been interpreted flexibly to include such writs as
common law certiorari and habeas corpus as well as injunctions .4
The language of the statute itself prescribes several limitations on its
scope. First, it authorizes only those writs that are "necessary or appropri-
ate." Although the common law writs upon which the Act is based were
considered "extraordinary remedies," 55 the Supreme Court has at times
used broad language in defining the scope of the Act,56 and the standard
against which its use must be tested is one of sound judicial discretion. 57 The
writ must also be "agreeable to the usages and principles of law." The
Court has not interpreted that to mean agreeable to the usages and principles
of common or English law; 58 the limitation is, in effect, also one of judicial
discretion. 59 The most sharply defined limitation on the use of the Act is that
the writ must be "in aid of [the courts'] respective jurisdictions." This
means that the Act does not confer or extend a federal court's jurisdiction, 60
and that it can properly be invoked by a district court only with respect to
jurisdiction otherwise obtained. 61 Thus, the proper exercise of power under
the Act depends, first, upon whether the court invoking the Act has metthe
jurisdictional requirement and, second, upon whether the specific action
taken by the court constitutes an abuse of that power.
The threshold question that the Supreme Court addressed in New York
Telephone Co. was whether pen registers are covered under Title III. The
Court concluded they are not, 62 and in so concluding removed pen register
orders from both the authority of Title I and its rigid procedural safe-
guards. The conclusion that pen registers do not pose the same threat to
privacy as wiretapping and eavesdropping, and therefore need not be
54. See, e.g., FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966) (court of appeals empowered
to temporarily enjoin consummation of merger pending FTC proceedings); United States Alkali
Export Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945) (Supreme Court empowered to review
district court order by writ of certiorari); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269
(1942) (court of appeals already having jurisdiction of proceeding empowered to issue writ of
habeas corpus).
55. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 52, § 3933, at 213.
56. In Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942), the Court used the
following language: "Unless appropriately confined by Congress, a federal court may avail
itself of all auxiliary writs as aids in the performance of its duties, when the use of such historic
aids is calculated in its sound judgment to achieve the ends of justice entrusted to it." Id. at
273. This language has been widely quoted. See, e.g., United States v. New York Tel. Co., 98 S.
Ct. at 372.
57. See Exparte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 584 (1943); Adams v. United States ex
reL McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942).
58. See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 281-82 (1948).
59. Id. at 284.
60. See MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 49, 110.26, at 282-83.
61. Id. 1110.29, at 318; see Commercial Security Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 456
F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir. 1972); Brittingham v. Commissioner, 451 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir.
1971).
62. 98 S. Ct. at 369.
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accorded the same safeguards, is supported by the Court's rationale-as
expressed in Berger v. New York63 and Katz-that the fourth amendment
protects oral communications. 64 Under that rationale, the question arises
whether the use of a pen register should be subject to the requirements of the
fourth amendment at all since the device does not overhear oral communica-
tions. In fact, the Court has never directly addressed that question65 and left
it unanswered in New York Telephone Co.66 If pen registers could be
employed without a warrant-like mail covers67 -then judicial authoriza-
tion would be unnecessary in the first place, and a district court would
presumably lack the requisite jurisdiction to invoke the All Writs Act to
order a telephone company to provide assistance. 68 The anomalous result
would be that the decision whether to allow a pen register to be used in a
particular case would be made by the telephone company rather than by a
federal magistrate. The Court avoided this problem in New York Telephone
Co. by assuming that the use of a pen register constituted a "search" within
the meaning of the fourth amendment, 69 and it found authority for the
district court to order its use in rule 41.
63. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
64. In Berger, the Court held that "conversation" was protected by the fourth amend-
ment. Id. at 51; see note 39 supra. In Katz, the Court concluded that listening to and recording
petitioner's "words" constituted a search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. 389 U.S. at 353; see note 42 and text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
65. The widely-quoted statement in Giordano that pen registers are subject to the require-
ments of the fourth amendment is in a separate opinion and is not part of the holding of the
case. See note 45 supra.
66. 98 S. Ct. at 369 n.7. It is arguable that the use of a pen register by law enforcement
officials violates the "justifiable" expectation of privacy that the person under investigation
has in using the monitored telephone, and that such an expectation of privacy is protected by
the fourth amendment. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (clarifying Katz).
But see Note, The Legal Constraints Upon the Use of the Pen Register as a Law Enforcement
Tool, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1028, 1042-47 (1975) (fourth amendment does not bar the use of pen
registers); cf. Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE
L.J. 1461 (1977) (use of "beepers"-electronic tracking devices-invades fourth amendment
rights in most cases and should be subject to statutory warrant requirements).
67. The post office conducts a mail cover by
furnishing the Government with the information appearing on the face of the envelope
addressed to the particular address: i.e., addressee, postmark, name and address of
sender (if it appears), and class of mail. The actual mail is delivered to the addressee
and only the letter-carrier's notation reaches the Government agency which requests
the mail cover.
United States v. Balistrieri, 403 F.2d 472, 475 n.2 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953
(1971). Mail covers have been found to be outside the protection of the fourth amendment. See,
e.g., Lustinger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132, 139 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968).
68. Justice Stevens reasoned that "[i]f . . . the individual's privacy interest is not
constitutionally protected, judicial intervention is both unnecessary and unauthorized." On this
hypothesis, the district court's order authorizing the pen registers was a "nullity" and therefore
could not support the further order requiring the Company to provide assistance. 98 S. Ct. at
379 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); see text accompanying note 61 supra.
69. See 98 S. Ct. at 370.
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The Supreme Court's conclusion that rule 41 authorizes the use of pen
registers is not supported by a literal reading of the rule itself, which limits
its scope to tangible property. 70 Nonetheless, the Court has recognized in
Katz and in Osborn v. United States71 that nontangibles such as oral
communications can be the objects of a proper search and seizure. 72
Moreover, Congress clearly intended that the permissibility of pen registers
survive the enactment of Title rn. 7 3 Finally, a federal magistrate is already
empowered under Title II to order more intrusive electronic surveillance
that does intercept oral communications. 74 In light of these considerations,
the Court interpreted rule 41 flexibly to effectuate its purpose of prescribing
the requirements of a constitutionally valid search and seizure.
The practical effect of this part of the New York Telephone Co.
decision will be to ensure that the procedural safeguards of rule 41 apply to
pen register orders. 75 The result of noncompliance with those requirements
will be the exclusion of any evidence obtained by means of the surveillance
from use in a criminal prosecution. 76 Problems of construction are certain to
arise because the rule as written is not intended to include nontangible
property. 77 The purpose of deterring unlawful conduct in the area of crimi-
nal investigation will be better served, however, by subjecting the use of pen
registers to the procedures of rule 41 than to none at all. Moreover, when
pen registers are used in conjunction with wiretaps, as they frequently are,
their use arguably will be subject to the even stricter procedures of Title
rff. 78
70. See text accompanying note 33 supra. The Court cited FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b) to
support its conclusion, but that rule is inapposite. Rule 57(b) specifically concerns two prob-
lems: the nonconformity of federal criminal procedure to state criminal procedure and the
details of trial procedure; it is not a general grant of authority. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b),
Notes of Advisory Comm.
71. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
72. 389 U.S. at 354-56 & 355 n.16; 385 U.S. at 329-31.
73. See note 29 supra.
74. See text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
75. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41; id., Notes of Advisory Comm.
76. "[E]vidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment" and fruits of illegally
seized evidence "cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of an illegal search
and seizure." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); see FED. R. CalM. P. 41(e).
77. The Court addressed two of these problems in dicta- the notice requirement of rule
41(d) and the requirement that the search be conducted within 10 days-and concluded that
neither barred the use of rule 41 to authorize a pen register order. 98 S. Ct. at 371 n.16.
78. At least one court has held that a pen register is an interception of a wire communica-
tion within the meaning of Title III when used in conjunction with a court-ordered wiretap.
United States v. Lanza, 341 F. Supp. 405, 422 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
From the point of view of the telephone company, the Court's characterization of the use
of a pen register as a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment is more
problematic. Because it is now clear that a rule 41 warrant is required to use a pen register in a
criminal investigation, it could be argued that the telephone company's use of pen registers for
business purposes constitutes a violation of the fourth amendment. The telephone company
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Before the Supreme Court's decision that the All Writs Act authorizes a
district court to order a telephone company to provide facilities and technical
assistance in connection with a pen register order, three federal courts of
appeals faced the identical issue;79 of those three, only the Sixth Circuit, in
Michigan Bell Telephone Co., actually held that the All Writs Act em-
powered the district court to order the telephone company to provide
assistance.80 In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court failed to
confront the difficult problem raised by Justice Stevens in the dissent:
whether the district court had obtained jurisdiction, apart from the All Writs
Act, over the "dispute" between the FBI and the Company. 81 The Court
evidently assumed that the original jurisdiction exercised by the district
court in authorizing the use of pen registers was sufficient in scope to
include the telephone company whose cooperation was necessary for the
execution of the order, 82 even though the Company was a third party not the
target of the investigation. On the basis of that rationale, however, a district
court could theoretically, upon a mere showing of probable cause, compel
uses pen registers in the normal course of business to check for defective dials and overbilling.
See United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176, 181 (7th Cir. 1966). They are also used to investigate
annoying or obscene telephone calls. See Claerhout, The Pen Register, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 108,
110-11 (1970). See generally Note, The Legal Constraints Upon the Use of the Pen Register as a
Law Enforcement Tool, supra note 66, at 1029 & n.11. Pen registers, however, are not
prohibited by either Title III or § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934. Section 803 of Title
III amended the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064 (formerly codified at
47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964)), to prohibit the interception and divulgence of "any radio communica-
tion." Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 803, 82 Stat.
197 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970)). Before this amendment to § 605, the Seventh Circuit
had held in Dote that § 605 prohibited the use of pen registers, see 371 F.2d at 181, but that
holding has since been overruled, Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926, 931-32 (7th Cir.
1973). Moreover, unlike Title III, rule 41 confers authority but does not proscribe otherwise
lawful activity. At least one court has held that the use of a pen register by the telephone
company did not violate the subscriber's rights under either the fourth or fifth amendments.
State v. Holliday, 169 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 1969). It is also clear that there is no bar to the use of
evidence unlawfully obtained by private persons so long as the government played no part in
the unlawful conduct. C. WRIGHT, supra note 34, § 661, at 20. Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i)
(1970) provides that it is not unlawful for a communication common carrier "to intercept,
disclose, or use that [wire] communication in the normal course of [its] employment."
79. Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 716 (1978);
United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976).
80. 565 F.2d at 389. Both the Eighth and the Seventh Circuits held that the All Writs Act
was "analogous" authority to the district court's power to order the telephone company's
assistance to prevent the frustration of its order. United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
546 F.2d 243, 246 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 716 (1978); United States v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 814 (7th Cir. 1976). Both Circuits found that the district
court's "inherent authority" to order pen register surveillance extended to the authority to
order the telephone company's assistance. 546 F.2d at 246; 531 F.2d at 811; see note 31 supra.
81. 98 S. Ct. at 380 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. See id. at 372. Otherwise, the district court would not have met the requirement that
the exercise of authority under the Act be in aid of the court's jurisdiction. See text accompany-
ing notes 60 & 61 supra.
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any unwilling third party, under the threat of contempt, to provide such
assistance as the court in its discretion deemed necessary to effectuate its
order. This proposition is indeed unsettling;8 3 however, the holding in New
York Telephone Co. is substantially more limited.
The Court presented three major justifications for its decision. First,
the Company itself, a regulated public utility, 84 offered no substantial
reasons why it should not provide assistance in investigating the suspected
illegal use of its facilities,8 5 and the order provided that the Company be
compensated at prevailing rates for any assistance that it furnished the
FBI.86 Second, the Company was in the unique position of being able to
deny the FBI the means to carry out its investigation.8 7 Finally, Congress
provided in a 1970 amendment to Title I that a "communication common
carrier" such as the Company can be ordered to provide "information,
facilities, and technical assistance" in connection with electronic surveil-
lance authorized under Title I.88 In light of these circumstances, the Court
understood this to be an extraordinary case that justified an extraordinary
remedy.
The real significance of the New York Telephone Co. decision lies in
its potential to be misinterpreted by the lower federal courts as precedent for
expanding the scope of rule 41 and the All Writs Act. Because the Supreme
Court apparently found that the district court had obtained original juris-
diction over the Company under rule 41, it is possible to read New York
Telephone Co. broadly as sanctioning the use of the All Writs Act to order
any third party to assist in the implementation of a search warrant. If district
courts interpret the decision as authority for invoking the All Writs Act to
83. The Second Circuit expressed its reluctance to approve the district court's order
compelling the Company to provide assistance in the following language:
Perhaps the most important factor weighing against the propriety of the order is that
without Congressional authority, such an order could establish a most undesirable, if
not dangerous and unwise, precedent for the authority of federal courts to impress
unwilling aid on private third parties. . . . In this best of all possible worlds it is a law
of nature that one thing leads to another. It is better not to take the first step.
In re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 538 F.2d 596, 962 (2d Cir. 1976).
84. 98 S. Ct. at 373. The Sixth Circuit emphasized in Michigan Bell Telephone Co. that "a
telephone company is no ordinary third party. It is a public utility, enjoying a monopoly in an
essential area of communications." 565 F.2d at 389.
85. See 98 S. Ct. at 373. At the same time that Congress amended Title III to empower
district courts to compel communication common carriers to provide assistance in connection
with wiretap orders, it also provided that good faith compliance with such orders is a complete
defense to both criminal and civil liability. Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 211(a),
(c),,84 Stat. 473 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)(a)(ii), 2520 (1970)). This defense would be
neither available nor necessary in the case of pen registers, because they are not prohibited by
Title III in the first place. See Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Use of
a Pen Register Device, 407 F. Supp. 398, 403 n.3 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
86. 98 S. Ct. at 373.
87. Id. at 373-74.
88. Id. at 374; see note 8 supra.
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compel tangentially involved third parties to assist in the execution of their
orders, then New York Telephone Co. will be dangerous precedent in the
hands of overzealous law enforcement officials and federal magistrates.
Although clear abuses of discretion should not withstand judicial review, the
results could nonetheless be oppressive. If, however, New York Telephone
Co. is viewed as a pragmatic solution limited to the problem of executing
pen register surveillance in the absence of specific legislation, then the
decision will have little precedential value in other areas of search and
seizure. Several practical considerations militate in favor of the latter in-
terpretation.
First, in criminal investigations that typically involve the use of pen
registers-gambling, racketeering and wirefraud- the evidence obtained
by means of electronic surveillance is essential to successful prosecution.
8 9
Moreover, the ongoing and "professional" nature of such criminal activity
demands sophisticated surveillance techniques. 90 Telephone companies vir-
tually control the means and expertise necessary to conduct such investiga-
tions. As long as they are compensated for providing their services in
connection with pen register surveillance at prevailing rates, they have no
substantial interest to protect by not providing the facilities and assistance.
Second, Congress has already given district courts the power to direct
communication common carriers such as the telephone company to provide
such assistance in connection with court-ordered electronic surveillance
under Title HI. 91 The only reason that pen register surveillance cannot be
enforced under that authority is that in 1968 Congress did not consider pen
registers intrusive enough to be prohibited by Title HI. Common sense
dictates that if a district court can order the telephone company to assist in
executing a wiretap order that intercepts oral communications, it should be
89. See, e.g., United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605, 608-09 & 608 n.2 (5th Cir. 1975). See
generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 71-74, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 2159-61 (quoting UNITED STATES PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 201-02 (1967));
Silver, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Prosecutor's View, 44 MINN. L. REV. 835
(1960).
90. For an example of the difficulties encountered in conducting electronic surveillance
against organized criminal activity, see Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d at 386.
91. See note 8 supra. There are no reported cases challenging the constitutionality of the
1970 amendment to Title III which gave federal magistrates the power to order third parties to
provide assistance. Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 21 l(b), 84 Stat. 473 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1970)). The constitutionality of Title I1, and particularly § 2518, has been
confirmed. See, e.g., United States v. Fucarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1037-38 (D. Md.), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd mem., 473 F.2d 906 (4th Cir.
1973), aff'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). It should also be noted that the 1970 amendment extends not
only to communication common carriers but to "landlord[s], custodian[s] or any other
person[s]." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1970). Thus, even if the telephone companies have conceded
the validity of the section, there are other parties with potential standing to contest its
constitutionality.
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able to direct the same company to assist in determining the number to
which the intercepted call was placed or from which it originated. 92 Finally,
as the Court itself recognized, federal courts may not impose unreasonable
burdens upon third parties. 93 The use of the All Writs Act is reserved for
truly extraordinary cases and the decision in New York Telephone Co.,
necessitated by a unique and compelling set of circumstances, in no way
modifies that restriction. The Court decided that this was one of the rare
cases in which use of the All Writs Act was justified; however, the obvious
potential for abuse in imposing any burden upon a third party should
demand that such power be used sparingly. In this context, the words of
Judge Mansfield are pertinent: "Were the necessity lesser, or the burden
greater, in some future case, a district court might not be justified in
invoking its extraordinary powers." 9 4 Viewed in this manner, the decision
in New York Telephone Co. represents a judicial solution to a problem that
should eventually be cured by remedial legislation,95 not an expansion of the
scope of authority conferred by either rule 41 or the All Writs Act.
CORNELIUS WESLEY COGHILL, III
92. New York Telephone Co. should logically apply to the use of tracing devices as well as
to the use of pen registers. See note 36 supra.
93. 98 S. Ct. at 372.
94. rn re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 538 F.2d 956, 965 (2d Cir. 1976)
(Mansfield, J., concurring and dissenting), rev'd sub nom. United States v. New York Tel. Co.,
98 S. Ct. 364 (1977).
95. The problem will not be cured by the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977 as it reads in
the present House version of that bill. H.R. 6869, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Section 3108(f)
defines "intercept" to mean "to acquire the contents of a communication through the use of an
eavesdropping device," id. § 3108(f), and § 1526(c) of the bill defines "eavesdropping device"
as "an electronic, mechanical, or other device or apparatus that can be used to intercept a
private oral communication," id. § 1526(c). Thus, pen registers would still be outside the scope
of the Act. It should be noted that the bill contains a section identical to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)
(1970), which empowers a federal magistrate to compel a communication common carrier to
provide assistance in connection with a court-ordered interception. H.R. 6869, § 3105(b)(2),
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Securities Regulation-Limiting Private Rights of Action
Under the Antifraud Provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
From the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act (Exchange Act)' in
1934 through 1972, United States Supreme Court opinions enabled and
encouraged the expansion of implied private rights of action under the anti-
fraud provisions of the Act.2 The Court's infrequent reviews of lower court
decisions 3 were pro-plaintiff, geared toward vigorous enforcement of the
Act4 and the accomplishment of its "broad remedial purposes." 5 Since
1972, however, Supreme Court opinions in securities fraud cases have
shifted dramatically. These more recent opinions have been pro-defendant
and have had the effect of restricting the scope of permissible litigation
under the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. 6 As a result, many
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, as amended by Act of June 29,
1968 (Williams Act), Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as additionally amended at 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78u (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1977)).
2. The antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act are: id. § 9(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78i(a) (1970)) (manipulation of security prices); id. § 10(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970))
(fraud in the purchase or sale of securities); id. § 14(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970))
(fraud in proxy solicitation); Act of June 29, 1968 (Williams Act), Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 14e, 82
Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970)) (fraud in tender offers).
3. Between the passage of the Securities Exchange Act in 1934 and 1972, the Court
issued six decisions interpreting antifraud provisions of the Act. In chronological order the
decisions were: J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (merger effected through circulation
of false and misleading proxy statement; implied private right of action exists under § 14(a) of
the Exchange Act as to both derivative and direct causes); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332
(1967) (withdrawable savings shares in savings and loan association are securities within the
meaning of the Exchange Act; investors who purchase shares in reliance upon misleading
advertisements are entitled to protection under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act); SEC v. National
Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (purchase or sale requirement of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act
does not prevent Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) injunctive action against accom-
plishment of merger through misleading statements); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375 (1970) (stockholders can prove that merger was accomplished through proxy statement that
failed to disclose material information by showing that statement is an essential link in transac-
tion); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (implied private
right of action under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act in favor of insurance company, represented
by New York Commissioner of Insurance on behalf of creditors, when individual defrauded
company by purchasing all of its shares through use of reserve fund); Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (plaintiffs allowed to recover from bank employees who
persuaded them to cash in their stock in the Ute Development Corporation without disclosing
non-Indian resale market at higher price even though plaintiffs did not prove reliance).
4. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-34 (1964).
5. Id. at 431.
6. From 1972 until the end of the 1976 October Term, the Supreme Court decided six
cases interpreting antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act. In chronological order the deci-
sions were: Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (plaintiffs who did not
purchase shares that defendant was required to offer them as result of antitrust consent decree
because of overly pessimistic statement accompanying offering did not have standing to sue
under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975)
(plaintiffs not entitled to injunctive relief against successful take-over bidder who had failed to
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investors who suffer injury because of manipulative securities transactions
are now prevented from seeking relief in federal courts.7 This result is
illustrated in Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc. (Crane HI), a case in
which a federal district court took note of the recent decisions and held that a
defeated tender offeror had no right of relief against a company that defeated
its offer by fraudulent practices that violated the Exchange Act. The inabili-
ty of the court to reach the issues of fraud presented in Crane raises
disturbing questions about the future of federal securities fraud litigation.
The Crane suit arose out of a battle for control of Westinghouse Air
Brake, Incorporated. In the summer of 1967 representatives of Crane ap-
proached Air Brake management about a possible merger of the two
companies and simultaneously began purchasing Air Brake shares on the
open market. 9 In November Air Brake informed Crane that it was not
interested in a merger; Crane responded by increasing its purchases of Air
Brake stock. Late in December Blyth and Company, investment bankers
and representatives of American Standard, Incorporated, Crane's largest
competitor in the plumbing industry, informed Air Brake that Standard
would be interested in helping Air Brake resist Crane's incipient take-over
bid. 10 Shortly thereafter, the directors of Air Brake approved a plan to merge
into Standard. I Under the proposed terms of merger, Air Brake stock, then
quoted at $36, would be exchanged for Standard convertible preferred stock
disclose its purpose as required by § 13(d) of the Exchange Act; plaintiff did not show
irreparable harm and there was an adequate remedy at law); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976) (defendant auditor not liable to purchaser as aider and abettor for failure to
discover client's fraudulent securities sales scheme because there was no allegation of scien-
ter); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (plaintiff could not recover under
§ 14(a) of the Exchange Act based on allegations that defendants had accomplished a merger
through a misleading proxy statement because plaintiff had not shown substantial likelihood
that omitted fact would have had actual significance in deliberations of reasonable sharehold-
er); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (tender offeror whose offer was
defeated by practices that violated the Exchange Act has no standing to sue for damages under
§ 14(e) of the Williams Act); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (minority sharehold-
ers of company merged into defendant under Delaware short-form procedure cannot recover on
grounds of unfairness and lack of notice because § 10(b) of the Exchange Act is not concerned
with fairness and the disclosure requirements are controlled by state law).
7. See generally Aranow, Einhorn & Berlstein, Standing to Sue to Challenge Violations
of the Williams Act, 32 Bus. LAw. 1755 (1977); Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891 (1977).
8. 439 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Crane III].
9. Id. at 946-47.
10. Id.
11. On February 20, 1968, Crane filed schedule 14-B, a form required by SEC rule 14a-
1(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-I l(c) (1977), as a prerequisite to soliciting proxies for the election of
a corporation's board of directors. The Air Brake directors immediately met to discuss Blyth's
February 19, 1968, proposal to merge Air Brake into Standard. On March 4 the directors met in
formal session and voted for the merger. On March 5 Air Brake informed its shareholders of the
action taken by the directors and of the terms of the merger agreement. Crane Co. v. Westing-
house Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 791 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Crane 1].
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worth approximately $50. After announcement of the proposed terms Air
Brake stock rose to $44 on the New York Stock Exchange. 12
The controversial phase of the take-over contest began on April 8,
when Crane mailed to Air Brake shareholders an offer to exchange Air
Brake stock for Crane subordinated debentures worth approximately $50.
During the same week, Air Brake mailed its proxy statement soliciting
proxies in favor of the proposed Standard merger. 1" On April 19, the day
Crane's offer was to expire, Standard purchased 82,400 shares on the
market for cash at an average price of $49.08, while it engaged in undis-
closed private sales of 100,000 shares to a friendly investment company at
441/2 and 20,000 shares to a friendly investment banking house at 447/8.14 This
maneuver precluded any hope of success for Crane's initial offer. 15 Al-
though Crane finally managed to obtain 32% of the shares of Air Brake, the
proxy count at the May 16 meeting of Air Brake shareholders ran heavily in
favor of the Standard merger; 16 consequently, on June 7 that merger was
consummated. Crane's stock interest in Air Brake was converted into
Standard shares by the merger. On June 13, under threat of a divestiture
12. Crane I, 419 F.2d 787, 791 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
13. Id.
14. Crane III, 439 F. Supp. at 947. The last day of a tender offer is often the most
important because of the activity of professional risk arbitrageurs, a small group of individuals
associated with member firms of the New York Stock Exchange. Professional arbitrageurs
make large open-market purchases of the target company's shares somewhere between the
market price and the tender offer price for the purpose of subsequently tendering their shares at
a profit. The arbitrageurs usually wait until the last possible moment before deciding whether to
tender their shares. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
173-91 (1973). On April 19 arbitrageurs saw the tape price of Air Brake rise five points. This
sudden rise would cause the arbitrageurs not to tender their shares if they believed they could
sell on the market at 50 or above or if they believed that the rise in price would result in the
defeat of the tender offer and the consequent risk that shares tendered would be returned and
the market price would fall. The arbitrageurs could not accurately assess the market for Air
Brake shares because they and other investors were unaware that the sudden demand for Air
Brake shares was artificially created by Standard (of the 26,300 shares traded at 50 that day, all
but 100 were bought by Standard, Crane I, 419 F.2d 787, 893 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 822 (1970)), and they were unaware of Standard's two private sales of 120,000 shares
(Standard's telegram to one of its private purchasers confirming the sale was marked "HIGH-
LY CONFIDENTIAL," id.). These private sales were made at approximately the same price
that Air Brake opened at on April 19 and were indicative of the true market demand for Air
Brake shares. Id. If Air Brake shares had remained at 45 throughout the day the arbitrageurs
would likely have tendered to realize their profit on the offer as the price spread would make it
probable that ordinary shareholders would tender, the offer would be a success, and the risk of
nonacceptance would be low.
In the early proceedings in Crane the number of Air Brake shares purchased by Standard
was erroneously reported to have been 170,200. At the 1976 trial it was brought to the court's
attention that the correct figure was 82,400. Crane III, 439 F. Supp. at 947 n.l.
15. Having fallen short of control, Crane extended its offer past April 19. Even with this
extension, however, it was not able to secure the necessary number of shares. Crane I, 419 F.2d
787, 791 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
16. The proxy count was 2,903,869 for the merger and 1,180,298 against. Almost all of the
proxies against the merger were voted by Crane. Id.
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action to be brought by Standard under the antitrust laws, Crane sold all but
10,000 of its shares of Standard, earning a substantial profit. 17
In the midst of the take-over contest Crane filed two suits against its
opponents in federal district court. The first, against Air Brake, alleged
misrepresentation in the Air Brake proxy statement and requested an injunc-
tion against continued solicitation and use of the proxies.18 The second suit,
naming Standard and Blyth as defendants, attacked Standard's April 19
transactions in stock as illegal purchases of proxies and as "market manipu-
lation" and "fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities." 19
17. Crane earned a profit of "several million dollars" and later disposed of all but 1000 of
the remaining shares. Id.
Shortly after Crane sold its stock, Standard and several Standard shareholders filed suit
against Crane alleging that Crane's sale of Standard shares within six months of its purchase of
Air Brake shares was a violation of § 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970)
(regulating short swing profits on insider trading). Crane entered a counterclaim for damages it
had sustained by virtue of Standard's allegedly fraudulent action opposing its tender offer. In
American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 346 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the judge granted
Standard's motion for summary judgment and denied Crane's. On appeal, 510 F.2d 1043 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975), the court of appeals reversed. Following the
rationale of Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973), the court held that
§ 16(b) liability should not be imposed on Crane for its sale because plaintiffs had failed to show
that there was any likelihood that Crane, as a 10% shareholder, had access to or had abused
inside information. 510 F.2d at 1053-56. After the court of appeals decision Crane dropped its
counterclaim and proceeded to pursue its damages in Crane III, 439 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
18. Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332, 335 (2d Cir. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as Crane II]. This suit was filed April 17, 1968.
19. Crane I, 419 F.2d 787, 791-92 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). Illegal
purchases of proxies are a violation of § 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 378n(a) (1970);
"market manipulation" is a violation of § 9(a)(2), id. § 78i(a)(2), and "fraud in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities" is a violation of § 10(b), id. § 78j(b), and SEC rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
Section 9(a)(2) makes it unlawful:
To effect, alone or with one or more other persons, a series of transactions in any
security registered on a national securities exchange creating actual or apparent active
trading in such security or raising or depressing the price of such security, for the
purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others.
15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1970). Liability for a violation of § 9(a)(2) is provided by § 9(e):
Any person who willfully participates in any act or transaction in violation of subsec-
tions (a), (b), or (c) of this section, shall be liable to any person who shall purchase or
sell any security at a price which was affected by such act or transaction, and the
person so injured may sue in law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction to
recover the damages sustained as a result of any such act or transaction.
Id. § 78i(e). Section 10(b) reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. § 78j(b). Rule 1Ob-5, adopted by the SEC pursuant to § 10(b), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
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Crane prayed for an injunction against Standard voting its Air Brake stock,
consummating the merger or performing any further acts that violated the
Exchange Act 2° and also for "such other and further relief as may be just
and proper." ' 21 The two suits were consolidated for trial and on June 5,
1968, the district judge entered an order dismissing the consolidated com-
plaint on the merits.22 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. (Crane I)23 affirmed
the dismissal except as to the claims against Standard for its April 19 stock
transactions. On remand to the district court for a determination of appropri-
ate relief, the proceedings were stultified by an order granting Standard's
motion to have all issues relitigated before a jury.24 At Crane's request the
order was certified for appeal, 25 and in 1973 the case returned to the court of
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
20. Crane III, 439 F. Supp. at 947.
21. Id.
22. Crane II, 490 F.2d 332, 335 (2d Cir. 1969).
23. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). The court held that the
April 19 transactions violated §§ 9(a)(2) and 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule lOb-5, see note
19 supra, and that Crane was entitled to such relief as in equity might be required for the injury
it suffered as a result of these transactions. 419 F.2d at 792, 804. The court rejected Standard's
defense that it had acted in good faith simply to increase its voting position in Air Brake while
keeping its holdings of Air Brake stock below 10% in order to avoid problems under § 16(b) of
the Exchange Act. Id. at 792. Section 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970), allows the issuer to
recover any profits made on "any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase of any equity
security of such issuer. . . within any period of less than 6 months" by corporate insiders. Id.
24. The proceedings on remand are described in Crane II, 490 F.2d 332, 337-39 (2d Cir.
1969). One district court order on remand was reported in Crane Co. v. American Standard,
Inc., 326 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). On remand Crane disclosed the following claims for
monetary relief:
(1) the difference in value between Crane's 32% block of Air Brake Stock, including
the value of control, and the Standard shares which were received in exchange
therefor after the merger of Air Brake into Standard, (2) similar damages with respect
to Air Brake stock which Crane was prevented from acquiring as a result of Standard's
alleged manipulation and deceit, (3) the value to Crane of control of Air Brake, (4) the
loss which Crane allegedly suffered from the forced sale of its Air Brake stock, for
antitrust reasons, subsequent to the merger, and (5) punitive damages.
Crane II, 490 F.2d at 337 n.6. These claims led Standard to move for an order "defining and
limiting the issues." The court granted this "to the extent of striking as a nonjury issue the
assessment of any money damages other than such amounts as may be required to render
equitable relief effective." 326 F. Supp. at 776-77. In addition, the order stated that if Crane
decided to formally amend its complaint to include the claims, Standard would be entitled to a
jury trial. This order was reaffirmed by another order issued July 6, 1973. The latter order
became the subject of a new appeal to the Second Circuit. 490 F.2d at 334-35.
25. Crane II, 490 F.2d 332, 334-35 (2d Cir. 1969).
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appeals as Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc. (Crane 1I).26 The appel-
late court ruled that the district court's order was erroneous and remanded,
directing the district court "to get on with the task" of determining relief.27
On remand, the district court (Crane Mfl)28 held a hearing on the issue of
relief. After this hearing, but before the court had rendered its opinion, the
Supreme Court decided Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. ,29 which held
that a defeated tender offeror had no private right of action under section
14(e) of the Exchange Act or SEC rule lOb-6.30 In September 1977 the
district court, taking note of Chris-Craft and other recent Supreme Court
opinions,31 held that Crane was entitled to no relief. 32
The history of the availability of relief to tender offerors under the anti-
fraud provisions of the Exchange Act is essentially the history of the Crane
case. Crane I established the right of a tender offeror to claim relief under
these provisions. It was hailed as a landmark decision 33 and was instrumen-
26. 490 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1973).
27. Id. at 345.
28. Crane III, 439 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
29. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
30. Chris Craft involved the question whether a tender offeror suing in its capacity as a
take-over bidder had standing to sue for damages under § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970)
(making fraud in connection with a tender offer unlawful), or rule lOb-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-6
(1977) (making purchases of securities outside the tender offer by the offeror unlawful). Chris-
Craft sought to gain control over Piper. Piper decided to fight the attempt with the assistance of
Bangor Punta and First Boston Corporation. Chris-Craft made a tender offer and Bangor Punta
countered with its own offer. In the course of the competition Chris-Craft filed suit alleging that
Piper had made misleading statements to Piper shareholders in opposition to the tender offer,
that Bangor Punta had made material omissions in its tender offer statement filed with the SEC,
that First Boston was liable for certifying the statement (all this in violation of § 14(e)) and that
Bangor Punta had purchased 120,000 shares in a private sale during the pendency of its tender
offer in violation of rule lOb-6 and proposed rule lOb-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 1Ob-13 (1977) (adopted
Nov. 10, 1969). The Supreme Court held that the legislative history of the Act of June 29, 1968(Williams Act), Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 781,
78m, 78n (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1977)), which amended the Exchange Act by adding § 14(e),
showed that Congress passed the Act solely for the purpose of protecting public investors who
are confronted with a tender offer, 430 U.S. at 35, and that a private right of action could be
implied only in favor of" 'the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.' " Id. at
37 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)). The Court's argument denying Chris-Craft relief
under rule lOb-6 emphasized that Chris-Craft came before the Court not as an ordinary
shareholder but as a defeated tender offeror and as such its claim stood outside the express
concern of the rule. Id. at 45. Chris-Craft is reviewed in Aranow, Einhorn & Berlstein, supra
note 7; 1976-77 Securities Laws Developments, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 861, 950-53, 960-63
(1977).
31. Crane III, 439 F. Supp. at 954. For cases noticed by the district court, see note 51
infra.
32. 439 F. Supp. at 958.
33. The following statement is representative:
Crane expands the anti-fraud provisions to an additional class of plaintiffs-those who
are not purchasers or sellers directly engaged in a securities transaction. The effect is
not to decrease the burden of proof required to establish a violation of rule lOb-5. but
rather to toll the death knell of the Birnbaum [v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); see text accompanying notes 35 & 36 infra]
doctrine.
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tal in setting the pattern of litigation between tender offer contestants that
existed until the Supreme Court decided Chris-Craft.34 The court of ap-
peals' flexible interpretation of the Exchange Act enabled Crane to over-
come difficult problems of establishing standing and claim relief as a victim
of securities fraud. This flexibility was clearly illustrated by the manner in
which the court dealt with the issue of standing-the most serious threshold
obstacle to Crane's suit.
Crane's first cause of action was based on rule lOb-5. At the time of
Crane I standing under rule lOb-5 was controlled by the rule of Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp.,35 requiring that one be an actual purchaser or seller in
the securities transaction affected by the wrongdoer to claim relief from the
wrongdoer. 36 In the Crane I court's view the Birnbaum rule, which it
implied had originally been concerned with establishing a causal link be-
tween the fraud perpetrated and the injury suffered, 37 was satisfied when
a nonpurchaser or seller, otherwise entitled to the Act's protection,
38
Note, Securities Exchange Act of 1934-Antifraud Provisions Applied to Tender Offers Affected
by Manipulative Practices and Nondisclosures, 45 TUL. L. REV. 188, 195 (1970); see, e.g.,
Recent Cases, Securities Regulation-Standing- Defrauded Tender-Offeror May Sue Under
Rule l0b-5 When Made a "Forced Seller" Under Threat of Antitrust Action, 23 VAND. L. REV.
885 (1970); Recent Developments, Securities Regulation-Tender Offers--Standing to Sue-
Purchaser-Seller Requirement, Corporation Making a Tender Offer Has Standing Under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to Seek Damages and Injunctive ReliefAgainst Anyone
Unlawfully Opposing Its Offer Despite the Fact that it Was Not Deceived in Its Own Purchases,
15 VILL. L. REV. 1002 (1970).
34. Crane I was the first case to grant a tender offeror standing to sue under the antifraud
provisions of the Exchange Act. Crane was granted standing to sue under rule lOb-5 because it
was forced to sell its shares after losing the take-over contest. See note 44 and accompanying
text infra. The decision to break new ground and grant Crane standing was consistent with the
trend of expanding private rights of action to investors who suffered injury caused by fraudu-
lent market activity. See cases cited note 3 supra.
On July 29, 1968, two months after the Crane litigation began, the Williams Act became
effective, adding the § 14(e) antifraud provision that does not contain the purchaser-seller
language of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5. See note 30 supra. The SEC had pressed for the passage of §
14(e) in that form to assure that all forms of fraudulent conduct in connection with tender offers
could be challenged by private litigants. See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note
14, at 116-19. After the Williams Act became law, tender offerors based their claims on both §
14(e) and § 10(b). After Crane I the following cases held that the tender offeror had standing to
sue under the Williams Act: Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.
1974); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 430
U.S. 1 (1977); Applied Digital Data Sys. Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,824 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus.,
Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,863 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
35. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
36. See generally L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3617 (2d ed. Supp. 1969); Boone &
McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SECRule l0b-5, 49 TEx. L. REV. 617,620 (1971); Comment,
The Purchaser-Seller Limitation to SEC Rule lOb-5, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 684, 685 (1968).
Just prior to Crane I, in Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d
Cir. 1969), the Second Circuit had denied standing to a tender offeror suing the target corpora-
tion for fraudulent practices in opposing the tender offer because the tender offeror was not a
purchaser or seller under the Birnbaum rule.
37. 419 F.2d at 797.
38. Id. at 795-96.
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established proof of causation. 39 Under the court's analysis, Crane satisfied
the rule both because "[w]hen [it] entered the securities market with its
tender offer, it was entitled to the Act's protection not only against being
deceived itself but also against deception of the investing public designed to
prevent the public from entering into securities transactions, "40 and because
it had established that Standard's deception of the public caused it injury. 41
Crane's second cause of action was based on section 9(a)(2)42 of the
Exchange Act, which prohibits transactions creating actual or apparent
active trading in a security. Standing to sue under that section is expressly
dependent upon plaintiff's status as a purchaser or seller. 43 The court
concluded that Crane's sale of stock on June 13, 1968, made it a seller under
the Act because the sale was the "intended and inevitable" result of
Standard's manipulation of the market. 44
The passage of eight years from Crane I to Crane I led to quite
different treatment of the case. The district court saw intervening Supreme
Court opinions as requiring reassessment of four issues explicitly or im-
plicitly decided by Crane I: the existence of an implied private right of
39. Id. at 797-98.
40. Id. at 796.
41. Id. at 797. The court determined that Crane's evidence was sufficient to prove that:
Standard's extraordinary buying . . . coupled with its large secret sales off the
market, inevitably distorted the market picture and deceived public investors, particu-
larly the Air Brake shareholders. The effect of these purchases was to create the
appearance of an extraordinary demand for Air Brake stock and a dramatic rise in
market price, as a result of which Air Brake shareholders were deterred from tender-
ing to Crane.
Id. at 793.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1970).
43. See note 19 supra.
44. 419 F.2d at 794. The court reasoned that when Standard purchased shares on April 19,
it did so for the purpose of defeating Crane's tender offer and consummating the Standard
merger knowing full well that, if successful, Crane would be forced to sell its interest in Air
Brake because of antitrust considerations. The court likened Crane's situation to Vine's in Vine
v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). Vine held shares
in Crown Company. Through deceptive practices Beneficial acquired 95% of Crown's shares
and then effected a short-form merger. This merger left Vine and other shareholders with only
the alternatives of selling the stock to Beneficial at an inadequate price or retaining their stock
in a nonexistent corporation. The court held that the disappearance of Crown had converted
Vine's stock into a claim for cash, id. at 634, and as a "forced seller" Vine was granted
standing to sue under rule lOb-5, id. at 635.
As a final note on the question of standing the Crane I court added that the passage of the
Williams Act "should serve to resolve any doubts about standing in the tender offer cases, even
where an offeror is not, as is Crane, in the position of a forced seller." 419 F.2d at 798-99. This
statement was clarified in a comment in the Second Circuit's next case involving a tender offer
contest, Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969),
the first case decided under the Williams Act. The court said: "The second prong of the
[Williams Act] is § 14(e). In effect this applies Rule lb-5 both to the offeror and to the
opposition-very likely, except perhaps for any bearing it may have on the issue of standing,
only a codification of existing case law." Id. at 940-41. For analysis of standing to sue under the
Williams Act after Chris-Craft, see Aranow, Einhorn & Berlstein, supra note 7.
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action under rule lOb-5 in favor of a tender offeror; a nonpurchaser's
standing to sue under rule lOb-5 and section 9(a)(2); the adequacy of
Crane's proof of causation; 45 and Crane's entitlement to relief. 46 With
regard to the standing issues, Crane HT! applied the reasoning of Piper
v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.47 concluding that a tender offeror is merely
an incidental beneficiary of the antifraud provisions of the Exchange
Act and as such cannot assert an implied private right of action for damages
under rule lOb-5, 48 and that because the gravamen of Crane's complaint was
the lost opportupity to control, rather than losses resulting from "an impro-
per premium exacted for [Air Brake] stock," 49 it was not in the class of
investors protected by section 9 of the Exchange Act and therefore did not
have standing to sue under that section.50
45. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
46. See note 23 supra.
47. 430 U.S. 1 (1977), discussed at note 30 supra.
48. The Chris-Craft Court had developed this position in part by reexamining J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), the first case in which the Court had endorsed an implied
private right of action under a provision of the Exchange Act. The reasoning of Borak was that
private rights of action could be implied when they were shown to be a necessary supplement to
SEC enforcement to make effective the congressional purpose underlying the Exchange Act.
Id. at 432. According to the Chris-Craft reinterpretation, Borak held that an implied right of
action is never necessary unless it protects the interests of individuals for whose direct benefit a
provision of the Exchange Act is intended. See 430 U.S. at 25, 33, 41-42. The identity of those
individuals is to be determined by the language of the statute, id. at 24, and its legislative
history, id. at 25-26. In its examination of the Williams Act amendments to the Exchange Act,
under which Chris-Craft sought relief (in particular, § 14(e)), the Court determined that the sole
purpose of the Williams Act was the protection of public investors, see note 30 supra, and that
while tender offerors were regulated by the Williams Act, they were not its beneficiaries.
Applying this reasoning and extending it to a position that § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule
lOb-5 as well as the Williams Act were for the exclusive benefit of the "public investor," the
district court in Crane HI decided that the arguments against granting standing under § 14(e)
applied to Crane's claim of standing under § 10(b). 439 F. Supp. at 951-53.
Recognizing that Chris-Craft was "not directly analogous" to Crane, id. at 951, because
Chris-Craft was concerned with claims under § 14(e) of the Williams Act and rule lOb-6
whereas Crane sued under rule lOb-5 and § 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act, the court asked the
parties to submit memoranda analyzing the impact of Chris-Craft on Crane. In the memoranda:
Standard emphasized the similarity of the two cases, noting that Rule lOb-5 and §
9, relied upon by Crane here, were both among the bases for Chris-Craft's original
complaint. Standard assert[ed] that the legislative history of the 1934 Act evidences no
intent that these provisions would be applied to tender offers, or provide a private
cause of action for a defeated offeror. According to Standard, if a statute designed to
regulate tender offers-the Williams Act--does not give an offeror standing to sue for
damages, it would be anomalous to derive such a right of action from statutes directed
at other ends ...
Crane, naturally, [drew] quite a different lesson from Chris-Craft. That decision,
it . . .asserted, [did] not impair Crane's standing in this action; its holding [was] a
narrow one. The broad scope of the interests designed to be protected by the 1934 Act
[was] contrasted to the narrow aim of the Williams Act.
Further, Crane's trial posture as both a defeated tender offeror and a defrauded
seller [was] argued, with emphasis upon the Crane Iholding that Crane had standing to
sue by virtue of its position as a forced seller.
Id. at 950-51.
49. 439 F. Supp. at 953.
50. The Crane III court took note of the comments of the Supreme Court in Chris-Craft
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Of the other recent Supreme Court opinions pertinent to Crane, 5t the
district court found Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,52 which
reaffirmed the Birnbaum rule, 53 especially relevant. It thought an anomaly
would result if Blue Chip, which would bar suits against Standard under
rule IOb-5 by those who did not tender their shares to Crane because of
Standard's market manipulation, would nevertheless permit Crane to recov-
er for an injury substantially derivative of the nontendering shareholders.54
The Crane II court also drew attention to a portion of the Blue Chip
opinion countenancing the Birnbaum rule's denial of standing to
" '[investors] related to an issuer who [were not purchasers or sellers but]
suffered loss in the value of their investment due to corporate or insider
with regard to Chris-Craft's claim for damages under rule lOb-6 (which included a discussion of
§ 9 of the Exchange Act under which Crane was suing):
Unlike Section 10(b), however, Section 9 provides an express cause of action forpersons injured by unlawful market activities. Yet, that cause of action is framed
specifically in favor of "any person who shall purchase or sell any security at a price
which was affected by such act or transaction . . ." Congress therefore focused in
Section 9 upon the amount actually paid by an investor for stock that had been the
subject of manipulative activity. This is not, as we have seen, the gravamen of Chris-
Craft's complaint. It seeks no recovery for an improper premium exacted for Piper
stock; rather it desires compensation for its lost opportunity to control Piper. We
therefore conclude that, on its claimed basis for relief, Chris-Craft cannot avail itself
of Rule 10b-6.
Id. (quoting Chris-Craft, 430 U.S. at 46) (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied by Crane III
court). The district court found the similarities between the two cases controlling. Id.
51. The court stated:
Chris-Craft does not stand alone, it is not sui generis, distinguishable from all
other cases because of unusual facts or esoteric points of law. Instead, it is one of
several recent Supreme Court decisions which indicate that the Court is taking a hard,
new look at federal jurisdiction under the securities laws. Included in this trend are
Santa Fe [Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)] . . . ; TSC Industries, Inc. v.Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438. . . (1976); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
• . . (1976); and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723. . . (1975).
Id. at 953-54.
52. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
53. Id. at 755. For years standing under rule lOb-5 was limited by the rule in Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), that a person
who is merely misled into inaction-one who refrains from purchasing or selling because of
another's misstatements or omissions-cannot sue for damages. See text accompanying notes
35 & 36 supra. After the announcement of the rule a number of exceptions to it were
developed. See note 71 infra. The rule was severely criticized, see, e.g., A. JACOBS, TnE IMPACT
OF RULE IOB-5 § 38.01[d) (rev. ed. 1977), and one federal circuit rejected the rule, see Eason v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960(1974). In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, Blue Chip was required by an antitrust
consent decree to offer a substantial number of its shares to retailers who had used the stamp
service. In its offering to the retailers Blue Chip dissuaded some of the retailers from buying by
means of materially misleading statements containing an overly pessimistic appraisal of its
business so that the rejected shares could be offered to the public at a higher price. The
Supreme Court denied standing to the retailers, reaffirming the Birnbaum rule and declaring an
end to case-by-case erosion of the rule. The Court said there were policy advantages to the
Birnbaum rule-protection against vexatious litigation, indeterminate liability and difficult
problems of proof. 421 U.S. at 739-49.
54. 439 F. Supp. at 955.
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[trading]. .. which violate[d] Rule lOb-5' "I' in support of barring Crane
because "Crane itself [could] be compared to [this] class of potential
plaintiffs. "56 In the final portion of its opinion, using the fact that Blue Chip
expressed concern about the problems of proving causation and damages in
securities fraud cases as a springboard, the district court launched an attack
on Crane's proof of these elements.5 7 Crane had tried to show that Stan-
dard's market manipulation had caused its tender offer to fail, thus leading
to a failure in its take-over bid and a substantial diminution of the value of its
investment in Air Brake. 58 On the basis of the evidence presented, however,
the court held that even if Crane had standing it had not proved that it had
suffered any specific injury caused by Standard and therefore it was entitled
to no relief.59
On each of the four issues decided in Crane 111-existence of a private
right of action, standing to sue, causation and damages-the district court
could have decided for Crane, notwithstanding the recent Supreme Court
decisions. Chris-Craft's "narrow holding" that "a tender offeror, suing in
its capacity as a takeover bidder, does not have standing to sue [at law] for
damages under § 14(e)" 60 left open the question whether a tender offeror
could sue in equity for injunctive relief. 61 The Court's approval of Judge
Friendly's statement in Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls
55. Id. (quoting Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 738). Plaintiffs in Birnbaum were of this class.
Birnbaum involved a suit against the directors of Newport Steel Corporation, who, in their
official capacity, turned down a merger plan with Follansbee Steel Corporation. The president
then sold his controlling share of stock to Wilport Company at an above-market price. Plain-
tiffs, minority shareholders, sought recovery for the "control premium" the president exacted
from Wilport (plaintiffs would have shared in the value of the control premium if the merger
with Follansbee had been approved).
56. Id. at 955. Under the rationale of Crane I, Crane did not belong in this class because it
was the intended target of Standard's fraudulent activity and was forced to sell its shares
because of the activity. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
57. 439 F. Supp. at 955.
58. See id. at 956-57. In support of its position Crane offered evidence that on April 19
there was an attractive spread between the value of the Crane offer and the market price of Air
Brake stock. In addition, it presented expert testimony that but for the sudden rise in price
caused by Standard's manipulation its offer would have succeeded. Id. Standard, on the other
hand, presented its own experts who testified that Crane's offer was not so attractive because
there was a possibility that shareholders tendering to Crane would face capital gains tax,
whereas, if the merger went through, shareholders could exchange their stock for Standard
stock, equal in value to the Crane offer, and not be taxed. Id. at 957.
On April 19, 1968, Standard must not have been convinced of this position; it took a half
million dollar trading loss on that day to defeat Crane's "unattractive" offer. Id. at 947.
59. Id. at 958.
60. 430 U.S. at 42 n.28.
61. "We intimate no view upon whether as a general proposition a suit in equity for
injunctive relief, as distinguished from an action for damages, would lie in favor of a tender
offeror under either § 14(e) or Rule lOb-6." Id. at 47 n.33. Aranow, Einhorn and Berlstein
express their belief that injunctive relief should be available to tender offerors. Aranow,
Einhorn & Berlstein, supra note 7, at 1760-61.
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Corp. 6 2 that "in corporate control contests the stage of preliminary injunc-
tive relief, rather than post-contest lawsuits, 'is the time when relief can
best be given' "63 would seem to indicate that a tender offeror does have
such a right. Crane began its suit by seeking preliminary injunctive relief but
was denied such relief by the district court. 64 In Crane I the court of appeals
ruled that this denial had been error and remanded the case to the district
court to grant such relief as might equitably be required, 65 including dam-
ages. 66 In so doing, as the court of appeals explained in Crane H, it did not
convert the suit from one in equity to an action at law for damages. 67 As on
remand the district court would have had the power to order divestiture, the
court of appeals had mentioned damages as an alternative, "less onerous
equitable remedy against Standard than what the district court had the
power to decree. '"68 If Chris-Craft left open a tender offeror's right to
seek preliminary injunctive relief, it arguably also left open an offeror's
(Crane's) right to appeal the wrongful denial of preliminary relief and the
right of a court subsequently to grant retrospective equitable relief.69
62. 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969), discussed in note 44 supra.
63. 430 U.S. at 41-42 (quoting Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp.,
409 F.2d at 947).
64. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
65. 419 F.2d at 804.
66. Id. at 803-04.
67. 490 F.2d at 342.
68. Id. at 340 (emphasis added). The court of appeals stated that the power to award
damages was within the district court's equitable "clean-up" jurisdiction. Id. Under the
"clean-up" doctrine a court of equity has authority to accord full relief in any case within its
cognizance even though giving such relief might mean redressing injuries for which there is
an adequate remedy at law. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.7, at 83-84
(1973).
The Second Circuit compared the action it had taken to that taken in two prior cases
decided by the Supreme Court:
Mhe Borak Court approved a ruling. . . that, in a suit in equity to enjoin unlawful
proxy solicitation under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act with respect to a
merger since consummated, a district court "has jurisdiction under Section 27 to
award damages or such other retrospective relief to the plaintiff as the merits of the
controversy may require.". . . In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. . . . the Court
reaffirmed the right of a district court to award damages where a merger had been
consummated in the face of a pending equity suit alleging a misleading proxy solicita-
tion.
490 F.2d at 340 (citations omitted) (quoting J.I. Case v. Borak, 317 F.2d 838, 849 (7th Cir. 1963),
aff'd, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)).
69. In Chris-Craft the Supreme Court took note that the court of appeals had given
injunctive relief. 430 U.S. at 47. The Court held that the injunction against Bangor Punta, one of
the tender offerors, should not have been granted, saying
Chris-Craft prior to the trial on liability expressly waived any claim to injunctive
relief. The case was tried . . . exclusively as a suit for damages. . . . Under these
circumstances, our holding that Chris-Craft does not have a cause of action for
damages under § 14(e) or Rule 10b-6 renders that injunction inappropriate, premised as
it was upon the permissible award of damages.
Id. Crane does not fall within the rationale of this holding. In Crane there was no express
waiver of injunctive relief. Crane II, 439 F. Supp. at 947. In dissent in Chris.Craft, Justice
Stevens argued that Chris-Craft's right to injunctive relief should not have been decided
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On the issue of standing, Blue Chip reaffirmed the Birnbaum rule,
putting an end to "case by case erosion of the rule.' '70 Apparently, how-
ever, Blue Chip did not affect the exceptions to the Birnbaum rule recog-
nized at the time it was announced. 71 The most widely accepted exception to
the Birnbaum rule was the "forced seller" exception of Vine v. Beneficial
Finance Co. 72 In Crane I the court of appeals granted standing to Crane
relying on this theory. 73 If Blue Chip did not affect the exceptions to the
Birnbaum rule, then it had no application to Crane LI. Accordingly, Crane
had a strong argument that it did indeed have standing under rule lOb-5.
On the issue of causation, the district court could have found for Crane
on the basis of Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.74 and Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States.75 Defendant in Mills successfully solicited proxies for a
merger using a proxy statement that failed to disclose material information.
Plaintiff was not required to prove that the solicitation would have failed but
for the nondisclosure; rather, the Supreme Court held it sufficient that
plaintiff had shown that the defective proxy solicitation was an "essential
link in the accomplishment of the transaction." 76 Affiliated Ute, also
dealing with a problem of causation in a nondisclosure case, held:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure
to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recov-
ery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the
sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them im-
because it was not raised in the appeal briefs and the Court's action in setting aside the recovery
of damages "does not logically support the conclusion that there should be no remedy what-
soever for violations which the Court assumes, arguendo, were properly proved." 430 U.S. at
70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. 421 U.S. at 755.
71. Five principal exceptions to the Birnbaum rule had developed prior to Blue Chip: the
injunctive relief exception, see, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d
Cir. 1967); the forced seller exception, see, e.g., Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967), discussed in note 44 supra; the derivative action
exception, see, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); the aborted transaction
exception, see, e.g., Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1973); and the de
facto seller exception, see, e.g., James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973). Since
Blue Chip, several cases have granted standing to plaintiffs under these exceptions to the
Birnbaum rule. See, e.g., Horst v. W.T. Cabe & Co., [1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1977) (aborted transaction); Singer v. Magnavox Co., [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,830 (D. Del. 1977) (forced seller); Klamberg v. Roth,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,747 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (de facto
seller). Several commentators have also argued that the exceptions are generally still valid. See
Gallager, l0b-5 After Blue Chip Stamps: How Stands the Judicial Oak?, 80 DICK. L. REv. 1
(1975); 1976-1977 Securities Laws Developments, supra note 30, at 893-97; Note, Standing
Under Rule lOb-5 After Blue Chip Stamps, 75 MICH. L. REV. 413, 431-44 (1976).
72. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967), discussed in note 44 supra.
73. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
74. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
75. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
76. 396 U.S. at 385.
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portant in the making of this decision. . . . This obligation to
disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the requi-
site element of causation in fact."7
On the basis of these cases, the district court could have held either that
Standard's April 19 fraudulent stock transactions were an essential link in,
and therefore the cause of, the defeat of Crane's tender offer or that Standard
failed to disclose a material fact to Air Brake shareholders on April 19 and
therefore caused them not to tender their shares to Crane, thus resulting in
the defeat of Crane's tender offer.78
Even if Crane failed to prove that Standard caused specific injury for
which the court could fashion a remedy it would not necessarily follow (as it
did implicitly in the court's opinion in Crane Ill79) that Crane was entitled to
no relief. The Supreme Court anticipated that eventuality in Mills and said
that plaintiffs would still be entitled to attorneys' fees and reasonable
expenses to repay the cost of establishing the Exchange Act violation.80
Crane could in equity have been granted this same minimal relief. 81
77. 406 U.S. at 153-54 (citations omitted).
78. This reasoning was advanced by Crane in Crane III. 439 F. Supp. at 956 n.4. The
district court replied that even though there may be a presumption of reliance when it is logical
to presume that reliance in fact existed, "[t]he proof submitted by Crane makes this Court
doubt that such a presumption is necessarily logical." Id. In addition, the court cited Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion in Chris-Craft, 430 U.S. at 48, which had rejected the major-
ity's position that a tender offeror lacked standing to sue under § 14(e) but had said that Chris-
Craft should be denied relief because of insufficient proof of causation. The district court in
Crane III said its problem in finding causation was "akin to" Justice Blackmun's in Chris-
Craft:
"It is not enough for the offeror to prove that the competitor's violations caused the
shareholders of the target corporation to act in a certain way. In addition, the offeror
must show that the shareholders' reactions to the misstatements or omissions caused
the injury for which it demands remuneration. Even though the Mills-Affiliated Ute
Citizens presumption satisfies the requirement for proof of the first element of
causation, the absence of any evidence that the violations might have altered the
outcome of the contest for control would leave me unable to hold that the securities
law violations caused the disappointed contestant's ultimate injury-its failure to
acquire control of the target corporation."
439 F. Supp. at 956 n.4 (quoting Chris-Craft, 430 U.S. at 51 (Blackmun, J., concurring)). But if
the presumption satisfies the requirement of proof that investors acted in a certain way, in
Crane that they failed to tender their shares, it would logically follow that this caused the tender
offer to fail.
79. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
80. 396 U.S. at 392-97.
81. The "American rule" governing the award of attorneys' fees in litigation in the federal
courts is that attorneys' fees "are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of a statute or
enforceable contract providing therefor." Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,
386 U.S. 714,717 (1967). There are two exceptions to this rule-attorneys' fees may be awarded
"where a successful litigant has conferred a substantial benefit on a class of persons and the
court's shifting of fees operates to spread the cost proportionately among the members of the
benefited class," F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116,
129-30 (1974), or "to a successful party when his opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly or for oppressive reasons," id. at 129. See also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-59 (1975). Mills came under the first exception. The court
held that when plaintiffs established a violation of the proxy rules they restored fair and
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Despite the availability, and perhaps even the attraction, of these
alternative grounds for decision, it appears that the district court reached the
proper result in light of the present posture of the securities laws. The
arguments made for Crane's position are supportable, but they reflect policy
considerations and directions of another era of judicial decisionmaking. In
its recent opinions, the Supreme Court has not sought through technical
argumentation to stir the waters of securities fraud litigation, but rather has
sought through policy offensive to reverse the flow. To follow the leader-
ship of the nation's highest tribunal, judges must not simply understand new
legal doctrines applicable to securities fraud litigation, they must learn a
new way of thinking about the role of the judiciary in handling the cases.
Judges were once admonished that the federal securities laws should be
interpreted " 'not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate
. . . [their broad] remedial purposes' ";82 by implication, the statutes are
now to be read narrowly 83 and judges are to guard against case by case
informed corporate suffrage, which was a substantial service to the corporation and its share-
holders. To charge defendant corporation (all the shareholders) with attorneys' fees was "to
impose them on the class that ha[d] benefited from them." 396 U.S. at 396-97. Crane would fall
under the second exception. Standard's bad faith stock transactions made it necessary for
Crane to undergo litigation to recover the value of its investment; in such circumstances the
burden of attorneys' fees should be shifted to Standard. The power of a court to award
attorneys' fees to a successful rule lOb-5 litigant under the bad faith exception was recognized
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210-1i n.30 (1976). The award of attorneys' fees
in Crane would be further justified by the express provision of § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970),
allowing recovery of attorneys' fees by a party injured by a § 9(a)(2) violation.
82. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 151 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)). See also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
83. Of the recent "restrictive" opinions, three, Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); and Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976), turned on narrowing constructions of the language of the Exchange Act. In
Hochfelder the Supreme Court held that a private cause of action for damages would not lie
under § 10(b) and rule lob-5 in the absence of any allegation of "scienter," i.e., intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud on the defendant's part. Id. at 199-214. The Court reached this
conclusion on the basis of the language of the statute saying that "[t]he use of the word
'manipulative' . . . is virtually a term of art," id. at 199, its reading of the legislative history,
id. at 201-06, its observation that in other sections in which Congress created express civil
liability for acts of negligence it had no trouble specifying its purpose, id. at 206-11, and its
determination that the administrative history of the Exchange Act indicated that when the SEC
adopted rule lOb-5 the rule was intended to apply to activities that involved scienter, id. at 212-
14.
Plaintiffs in Green challenged the fairness of the terms of a short-form merger. The
Supreme Court relegated plaintiffs to "whatever remedy is created by state law," 430 U.S. at
478, and said that the concern of rule lob-5 was full disclosure and that "once full . . .
disclosure has occurred, the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential
concern of the statute," id. The Court added that "[a]bsent a clear indication of congressional
intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals
with transactions in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate regula-
tion would be overridden." Id. at 479.
Chris-Craft studied the legislative history of the Williams Act to determine the main
purpose of the statute and denied plaintiffs' right of action as not based upon that purpose. See
note 30 and accompanying text supra.
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erosion of established rules. s4 Once judges were encouraged to be "alert to
provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional
purposes";85 now judges are instructed to be on their guard against vexati-
ous litigation 86 and the dangers of indeterminate liability.87 Once it was
proposed that the federal securities laws were a pervasive scheme of regula-
tion intended to secure fair markets for all investors; it now appears judges
are to regard them as a limited, somewhat tentative effort88 to regulate the
securities markets for the benefit of public investors.8 9
Many reservations have been expressed about this abrupt change of the
judicial mind. The sharpest and most telling criticism has come from within
the Supreme Court itself. Mr. Justice Blackmun, in dissent in Blue Chip,
argued that the majority had let certain policy considerations-namely,
guarding against vexatious litigation and avoiding difficult procedural is-
sues-dominate its thinking and had evaded fundamental issues of sub-
stance.90 The salient issue in the case, said Blackmun, was the fact that
plaintiff had raised "disturbing claims of fraud.''91 The majority in ren-
dering their decision, paid no heed to the unremedied wrong but rather
devoted their attention to worries about the possible motives of potential
84. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 755.
85. J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
86. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 739-49.
87. Id. at 739-41.
88. In the majority opinion in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,477-80 (1977), it was
argued that rule lOb-5 is only concerned with disclosure and that once there is disclosure federal
courts should have no concern for fairness. This holding emasculates subsections (a) and (c) of
rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5(a), (c) (1977), which prohibit any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud, or conduct that operates as a fraud or deceit upon, any person in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security. The Court feared, however, that if the federal judiciary got
into questions of fairness
[t]he result would be to bring within the Rule a wide variety of corporate conduct
traditionally left to state regulation. . . .Federal courts applying a "federal fiduciary
principle" under Rule lOb-5 could be expected to depart from state fiduciary standards
at least to the extent necessary to ensure uniformity within the federal system.
430 U.S. at 478-79. The Court added: "There may well be a need for uniform federal fudiciary
standards to govern mergers such as that challenged in this complaint. But those standards
should not be supplied by judicial extension of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 'to cover the corporate
universe.' " Id. at 479-80 (quoting Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 633, 700 (1974), which expressed concern about the low standards for
corporate conduct in the Delaware corporation law; it is ironic that his article was quoted in
support of lower standards under federal law).
The majority opinion in Green countered the view expressed by various commentators that
decisions under the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act constituted a body of substantive
federal corporate law. See, e.g., Jacobs, The Role of the Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5 in
the Regulation of Corporate Mismanagement, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 27 (1973); Painter, Inside
Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal Corporate Law under Rule lOb-5,
65 COLUM. L. REV. 1361 (1965).
89. See generally Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 30-40.
90. 421 U.S. at 761-71 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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plaintiffs 92 and the problem that proof of causation might depend on "oral
testimony." 93 He concluded:
The facts of this case, if proved and accepted by the factfinder,
surely are within the conduct that Congress intended to ban.
Whether this particular plaintiff . . . will be able to carry the
burdens of proving fraud and of proving reliance and damage...
is a matter that should not be left to speculations of "policy" of the
kind now advanced in this forum so far removed from witnesses
and evidence.
I am uneasy about the type of precedent the present
decision establishes. Policy considerations can be applied and
utilized in like fashion in other situations. The acceptance of this
decisional route in this case may well come back to haunt us. . . I
would decide the case to fulfill the broad purpose that the language
of the statutes and the legislative history dictate. .... 94
Mr. Justice Stevens, in dissent in Chris-Craft, criticized the majority for
focusing on the narrow intent of ensuring enforcement of the securities laws
to protect the "public investor" and being oblivious to the fact that this
could only be accomplished by ensuring enforcement of the laws on behalf
of all investors who had an interest in the integrity of the securities market.
95
Stevens forcefully argued that in Chris-Craft the majority had excluded
from the class of plaintiffs those most interested in and most capable of
ensuring effective enforcement-the tender offeror itself.
96
92. Certainly, this Court must be aware of the realities of life, but it is unwarranted
for the Court to take a form of attenuated judicial notice of the motivations that
defense counsel may have in settling a case, or of the difficulties that a plaintiff may
have in proving his claim.
Id. at 770 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
93. [Ihe greater portion of the Court's opinion is devoted to its discussion of the
"danger of vexatiousness". . . that accompanies litigation under Rule lob-5 and that
is said to be "different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in
general." It speaks of harm from the "very pendency of the lawsuit,". . . something
like the recognized dilemma of the physician sued for malpractice; of the "disruption
of normal business activities which may accompany a lawsuit" . . . and of "proof
. . . which depend[s] almost entirely on oral testimony," . . . as if all these were
unknown to lawsuits taking place in America's courthouses every day. In turning to
and being influenced by these "policy considerations," . . . the Court, in my view,
unfortunately mires itself in speculation and conjecture not usually seen in its opin-
ions. In order to support an interpretation that obviously narrows a provision of the
securities laws designed to be a "catch-all," the Court takes alarm at the "practical
difficulties," . . . that would follow the removal of Birnbaum'sbarrier.
Id. at 769-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 770-71 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
95. [Pjrotection of tender offerors is not only consistent with protection of sharehold-
ers. It is also indispensable to protecting shareholders. Individual shareholders often
lack the capacity to litigate these cases effectively. Few indeed could afford to pursue
the course Chris-Craft has taken of hiring counsel with experience in complex litiga-
tion of this kind to litigate through a preliminary injunction, discovery, trial on
liability, another trial on damages, three appeals to the Second Circuit, including an en
banc, and three petitions to this Court. Thus, the most realistic deterrent to fraud on
shareholders is a damage suit brought by the opposition in the tender contest.
430 U.S. at 68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. If a private remedy must be applied to ensure full compliance with the statute, the
1978]
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The criticisms of Justices Blackmun and Stevens can be applied to
Crane. The factual situation presented to the district court was that on April
19 Standard willfully perpetrated a fraud on the shareholders of Air Brake
for the purpose of defeating Crane's tender offer. The substantive question
raised by the facts was whether, under either section 9(a)(2) or rule lOb-5,
Crane was entitled to the protection of the Exchange Act and could,
therefore, sue to recover for the injury it suffered as a result of the fraud. To
deny that Crane had such a right on substantive grounds the Crane HI court
would have had to refute the holding of Crane I that Crane was "entitled to
the Act's protection not only against being deceived itself, but also against
the deception of the investing public designed to prevent the public from
entering into securities transactions." 97 But Crane .I finessed the substan-
tive issue by invoking the standing requirement of the Birnbaum rule. It is
doubly ironic that Blue Chip, which had resurrected the Birnbaum rule to
guard against vexatious litigation and then had applied the rule in a suit
bearing none of the indicia of vexatious litigation, would be applied in
Crane, a suit similarly devoid of such indicia. Crane DI also avoided the
substantive issue by relying on the stare decisis effect of Chris-Craft even
though Chris-Craft involved different sections of the Exchange Act. In
applying Chris-Craft to Crane the Crane LIT court did not seriously ques-
tion whether tender offerors were excluded from the protection of section
10(b) as they were from the narrower section 14(e) as interpreted by the
majority in Chris-Craft. As a result, Crane 11I was able to achieve the same
result as Chris-Craft-denying standing to the party most interested in and
capable of enforcing the Exchange Act and permitting the defendant to
achieve control of a corporation by the use of fraudulent means expressly
proscribed by that Act. In the last portion of the district court's opinion,
concerning proof of causation, Crane was ostensibly assumed to have
standing to sue. But even there the substantive issue was not faced squarely
because Crane was only granted second-class standing: it did not have the
benefit of the presumption of causation to which, as plaintiff in a nondisclo-
sure case, it would normally be entitled. 98
The result in Crane and the results it presages are unsettling. The new
rules permit violators of securities laws to escape liability and deny relief to
their innocent victims. By so favoring defendants the Supreme Court has not
remedy must be available to the litigants who are most vitally interested in effective
enforcement. . . . Once one recognizes that Congress intended to rely heavily on
private litigation as a method of implementing the statute, it seems equally clear that
Congress would not exclude the persons most interested in effective enforcement
from the class authorized to enforce the new law.
Id. at 61-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. 419 F.2d at 797.
98. See note 78 and text accompanying notes 74-78 supra.
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restored equilibrium in the administration of justice. It has only, as demon-
strated in Crane IT, restricted the ability of the federal judiciary to deal with
substantive issues of fraud. The recent decisions may have the effect of
exposing the limitations of the existing securities laws and expediting the
adoption of more comprehensive federal legislation, 99 but the movement to
develop new federal legislation should not delay the effort to restore in
judicial interpretation of the Exchange Act primary concern both for dealing
with substantive issues of fraud and for fulfillment of the Act's broad
remedial purposes. 100
HERMAN FORTESCUE GREENE
99. For commentary on proposed federal corporate law, see Cary, supra note 88, at 701-
05; Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAW. 27
(1969); Schwartz, An Introduction to Symposium, Federal Chartering of Corporations, 61 GEO.
L.J. 71 (1972).
100. Crane III is currently on appeal to the Second Circuit. Telephone conversation with
Mr. Peter J. McKenna, attorney for plaintiff, New York, New York (Jan. 31, 1978).
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